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2015 XSEDE Federation Risk 
Assessment Overview 
01: Risk Assessment Approach & Broader Goals 
This document has been assembled from documentation on the XSEDE Wiki, originally created in 2012 
and later revised in 2015. It captures the work associated with performing the 2012 and 2015 XSEDE 
Risk Assessments and forms the basis of future XSEDE risk assessments. 
The risk assessment methodology used is the NIST 800-30 standard. The justification for this approach 
and how it fits in the larger risk management strategy is described in 02: A Risk-based Security Program 
for XSEDE. 
The scope of this effort and the actors involved are further described in the 03: Risk Assessment Project 
Sizing. 
Risk Assessment Team 
The initial effort utilized a team with representation from each of the operations divisions: Security, Data 
Services, XSEDENet, Software Support, Accounting and Account Management, and System Operational 
Support. We needed a broad team to gather information, vet documents and help determine the impact of 
threats against key assets. 
The update to this original assessment can be performed much more easily and only requires regular 
engagement from the XSEDE Security Working Group. Domain experts will be consulted as needed to 
determine the impact of key risks. 
System Characterization 
The system characterization defines the boundaries of investigation. It determines what hardware, 
software, services, interfaces and data are within that scope. It also discusses who uses the system, who 
supports it, and how it relates to XSEDE's mission.  
See 04: XSEDE System Characterization for details. 
Threat Profile 
A threat is the potential for a particular threat source to exercise a particular vulnerability towards a 
malicious end. If there is no vulnerability, there is no threat. And a threat is not the person or event that 
triggers a threat; that is the threat source (e.g., hacker, inept programmer, or flood). 
A threat profile is usually done before the vulnerability assessment. Even though you may not know 
specifically if you have vulnerabilities for the threats to exploit, you can state what are the expected 
common threat actors as well as what you are not going to protect against or address in the scope of this 
assessment. For us, we are ignoring natural and environmental threats, which would have to be 
determined separately one level lower by the major service providers. Instead, we focus on human 
threats, both intentional (e.g., direct attack or theft) and unintentional (e.g., poorly written software). We 
only consider threats to shared XSEDE infrastructure, XSEDE's trust fabric and the overall stability of the 
federation. Site specific threats should be considered in more detail by individual SPs. 
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See 05: Threat Profile for details. 
Vulnerability Identification 
A vulnerability is a flaw or weakness in system security procedures, design, implementation or internal 
controls that could potentially be exercised by a threat agent to result in a breach or violation of the 
system's security policy. In this phase of the risk assessment we identify as many federation-level 
vulnerabilities in XSEDE as we can, mapping each vulnerability to a threat action and threat source. 
06: Vulnerability Identification organizes all of this into one large table. Information was originally gathered 
by investigating assets from 04: XSEDE System Characterization, reviewing other risk assessments, 
interviews with people from each operations domain, and review and acceptance by the risk assessment 
team.  
The 2015 updates to this section were made based on changes to 04: XSEDE System Characterization, 
adding and retiring risks based on changes in XSEDE software and services. Further changes were 
made as changed security activities had mitigated certain vulnerabilities since the original assessment. 
Control Analysis 
Security controls are mechanisms in place to mitigate the risk of threats being realized and hence 
exploiting vulnerabilities in your infrastructure. Controls can be administrative (e.g., policies, standards, 
guidelines, training and other processes), technical/logical (e.g., authentication and authorization 
systems, file permissions, firewalls, intrusion detection systems, etc.), or physical (e.g., locked file 
cabinets, secured data centers, cameras, fences, etc.). 
Since risks are addressed by controls, it is important to understand the security controls already in place 
or planned. Without this step, you don't know where there are gaps. One of the outputs of the risk 
assessment is to recommend changes and additions to controls to address the highest impact and most 
probable risks. 
07: Control Analysis Matrix lists all the existing and planned controls with current status and notes. The 
final report will recommend modifications to this set of controls. 
Likelihood Determination 
In this step we qualitatively determine the likelihood that a vulnerability will be exploited within the scope 
of 05: Threat Profile derived earlier. We then rank the likelihood as high, medium or low. In this ranking 
three things are considered: 
● the motivation and capabilities of the threat source 
● the specifics of the vulnerability 
● the effectiveness of current controls to mitigate associated risks 
 
Borrowing a table from the NIST 800-30, here are the definitions for high, medium and low. 
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LIKELIHOOD LEVEL LIKELIHOOD DEFINITION 
High The threat-source is highly motivated and sufficiently capable, and controls to 
prevent the vulnerability from being exercised are ineffective. 
Medium The threat-source is motivated and capable, but controls are in place that 
may impede successful exercise of the vulnerability. 
Low The threat-source lacks motivation or capability, or controls are in place to 
prevent, or at least significantly impede, the vulnerability from being 
exercised. 
 
Each vulnerability, and hence risk, maps to a row in the table from 06: Vulnerability Identification. Rather 
than replicate the table in several places where it can become out of sync, we added new likelihood 
column to the existing table. 
Decision Process 
As a first round, we used blinded (to all but the risk assessment lead) votes via email for each item. As 
long as 2/3 of the team voted on an item and the votes had a standard deviation less than 0.7, we took 
the average of the votes and chose the closest probability ranking. To compute a numerical average, 
each ranking received a numerical value of 1, 2 or 3, and the average was simply the arithmetic mean. 
For other items, there is either wide-spread disagreement or a lack of understanding to gain quorum. 
These were resolved over a phone meeting. If quorum was the problem and the team lead could not get 
enough votes, then a threat scenario would need to have been written up on the issue by the most expert 
person of the team for that item. Other items were discussed on a phone meeting with quorum until a 
majority decision was made (All items had quorum in this case). The call started with a reminder of what 
the different rankings of high, medium and low mean, and the chair's synopsis of the disputed items and 
why he voted how he did. 
● Initial Risk Rankings Votes Matrix 
● Final votes with phone meeting notes 
2015 Updates 
Based on changes in 04: XSEDE System Characterization and the set of security control changes since 
the original assessment, risks were updated by the security analyst with review and advisement from the 
larger XSEDE Security Working Group. Some risks were mitigated or retired based on changes in 
XSEDE, three new risks were added. 
Impact Analysis 
In the previous step we estimated the likelihood of particular vulnerabilities being exploited by specific 
threats. In this step we evaluate the impact of such exploitations. This is somewhat more challenging and 
fuzzy as we have to keep several things in mind. 
First, the impact of any exploit is going to depend upon (1) the mission of XSEDE, (2) the criticality of the 
vulnerable system or data to XSEDE, and (3) the sensitivity of the affected system or data. This 
information is usually found in a mission or business impact analysis, but XSEDE has no such 
documentation. There is a mission statement noted in 04: XSEDE System Characterization, and there is 
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a categorization of XSEDE services into tiers in the XSEDE services master spreadsheet, however. But in 
cases where it is not clear how critical a system is, we relied upon the system owner or maintainer's help. 
Impact from a security incident could affect the integrity, availability or confidentiality of a system or data. 
Depending on the system affected, we could be concerned more with one kind of impact than another. 
Particularly, in light of XSEDE's mission, it would most often be that integrity and availability are of more 
concern than confidentiality. However, the impact on each of these three properties should be considered 
for any potential exploit. 
Borrowing a table from the NIST 800-30, here are the definitions for high, medium and low. 
IMPACT LEVEL IMPACT DETERMINATION 
High Exercise of the vulnerability (1) may result in the highly costly loss of major tangible 
assets or resources; (2) may significantly violate, harm, or impede an organization’s 
mission, reputation, or interest; or (3) may result in human death or serious injury. 
Medium Exercise of the vulnerability (1) may result in the costly loss of tangible assets or 
resources; (2) may violate, harm, or impede an organization’s mission, reputation, or 
interest; or (3) may result in human injury. 
Low Exercise of the vulnerability (1) may result in the loss of some tangible assets or 
resources or (2) may noticeably affect an organization’s mission, reputation, or 
interest. 
Decision Process 
We follow the same process of voting on impact as in the previous phase of likelihood determination. The 
results of these votes are recorded in the same table on 06: Vulnerability Identification as the likelihood 
decisions are. The detailed spreadsheet results are linked to below. 
● Final Risk Assessment Votes 
2015 Updates 
Based on changes in 04: XSEDE System Characterization and the set of security control changes since 
the original assessment, risks were updated by the security analyst with review and advisement from the 
larger XSEDE Security Working Group. Some risks were mitigated or retired based on changes in 
XSEDE, three new risks were added. 
Risk Determination 
With likelihood and impact analysis complete, we can calculate numeric values for each risk to rank them. 
We use the table below which gives a weight for both likelihood and impact. Numerical weights are in 
parentheses, and underneath are the number of risks of the give ranking in bold. 
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 LOW IMPACT (10) MEDIUM IMPACT (50) HIGH IMPACT (100) 



















There are a few things to notice from this ranking. First, as we had no high impact risks, none resulted in 
a total risk labeled as high. The highest we had were 3 Medium risks with highly likely exploitation and 
medium impact. These 3 risks with a ranking of 50 are a natural place to start when considering what 
risks to address with new controls first. 
Second, we see that the most common ranking is 25, a medium risk, but lower than the other three 
mediums. There are more low rated risks than all the others combined when we add together the three 
types of low risks. Work after addressing the three rank 50 risks should probably take from the pool of 
risks ranked 25. Resources and available controls will influence the priority among those 12 risks. 
The four rank 50 risks are: 
● that passwords can be easily compromised and harvested 
● that a zero-day root escalation exploit is discovered in a common piece of software used by 
XSEDE and exploited by an attacker with stolen credentials 
● that because there is no regular security training for users or service providers, policies are not 
followed and lead to mistakes or accidents that attackers can exploit 
Specific rankings for each risk can be found in 06: Vulnerability Identification. 
Control Recommendations 
As noted above in the control analysis section above, XSEDE already employs many security controls to 
meet its operational and security goals. In this section we list recommended changes or additional 
controls to mitigate, contain, eliminate or transfer the risks discovered in this process. This are prioritized 
high, medium or low. High priority controls address the risks ranked 50 or above; medium priority 
addresses risks rated 25-49; and low is for risks rated less than 25. 
In 08: Control Recommendations we organize all of these controls and note which risks they address by 
numerical index in 06: Vulnerability Identification. 
Accepted Risks 
Some of these controls are not likely worth the cost, and it is not merely an issue of priority. Therefore, not 
all of the controls are labeled as RECOMMENDED in 08: Control Recommendations. Risks with no 
recommended controls are one that we recommend XSEDE ACCEPT. In these cases, the cost of 
mitigating controls from usability, performance or raw dollars cannot be justified. 
These are risks: #1, #4, #6, #8, #10, #15, #19, #20, #21, and #24 
Download the 2015 XSEDE Risk Assessment Final Report. 
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02: A Risk-based Security Program for XSEDE 
The Goal 
Security Management is at the core of an organization's information security structure. As Shon Harris 
says, "Security management includes risk management, information security policies, procedures, 
standards, guidelines, baselines, information classification, security organization, and security 
education."1 This is a continuous process, and the goal is to develop and help implement a formal, risk-
based security program for XSEDE. 
This process is guided by a security analyst, working with the XSEDE Security Officer and the XSEDE 
Security Working Group. A security analyst works at a higher, more strategic level than security admins 
and incident responders, and he helps develop policies, standards, and guidelines, as well as set various 
baselines. Whereas security admins, system administrators and incident responders are focused on daily 
operational needs and specialize on pieces and parts of the security program, a security analyst helps 
define the security program elements and follows through to ensure the elements are coordinated and 
carried out properly as a whole. 
Planned Deliverables for XSEDE 
To develop a formal risk-based security program for XSEDE several things were needed. All of these 
have been developed to some extent during the first 3 years of XSEDE, but they require periodic 
updating. 
● a risk assessment for XSEDE at a federation level and a process for individual sites to drill down 
and perform similar assessments for their programs; 
● federation security policies, procedures and security blueprints (i.e., logical/technical controls to 
mitigate federation-wide risks for XSEDE); 
● a more well-defined security organizational structure with clear roles; and 
● plans for educating users and raising security awareness 
The Process 
The first 2 major goals, (a risk assessment and a set of policies, procedures & security blueprints), are 
tightly coupled and were completed in a sequential order during the first year. They form the backbone of 
XSEDE's risk management strategy, which is the process of identifying risk, reducing risk and 
implementing controls. Our risk management process can be described at a high-level by the following 
steps, which feed into each other: Threat Profile to Risk Assessment to Security Plans to Policies, 
Procedures and Blueprints. 
Threat Profile 
This involves understanding who and what could damage federation assets, identifying types of attacks 
and crimes that could take place, and understanding the impact of these threats and threat actors. We 
focus on cyber security and only federation-level threats. Threats that are specific to certain sites or don't 
affect the federation as a whole are considered when individual sites carry out their own risk 
assessments. We consider the types of adversaries or threat actors at a very high-level here with their 
general capabilities. This threat profile tries to capture the overall level of acceptable risk to XSEDE, and 
                                                     
1 Much of the language and definitions borrow from Shon Harris's CISSP study book. 
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hence required input from the leaders of XSEDE. While the XSEDE Security Working Group can inform 
this, the entire management team are stakeholders here. 
There are many kinds of threats, including environmental, application error, physical failure and disasters. 
Our goal is more focused to prioritize cybersecurity resources and develop security blueprints. Therefore, 
we have focused on application errors and a subset of threats called inside/outside threats, i.e. hacking, 
cracking and attacks, when we created our threat profile and performed the follow-on risk assessment. 
Information Risk Assessment 
A crucial part of the risk management process is risk assessment. Before a risk assessment is done, you 
must understand the risk tolerance of the organization and the general characterization of threats. This is 
why a short (1-2 page) threat profile was completed first. It was also critical, to scope the problem and do 
a Risk Assessment Project Sizing before starting the project. The sizing was used to decide kinds of 
assets and threats considered, the depth of analysis, and what can be done with the resources we have 
to carry out the analysis. A team that comprises multiple stakeholders was formed for the initial risk 
assessment, though not for periodic updates. 
While there are many types of risk analysis processes (e.g., NIST 800-30, OCTAVE, and AS/NZS 
4360:2004), all processes can be broken down at a high-level to the following steps: 
● identify assets & values; 
● identify threats and potential vulnerabilities; 
● determine impact/loss from realized threats and their likelihood of occurrence; and 
● balance impact with countermeasure selection. 
Risk assessments can be quantitative, qualitative, or a mix. Some things simply cannot be quantified, 
such as, reputation. Therefore, any complete risk assessment is likely to have at least some qualitative 
parts. It is particularly dangerous, and far too common, to make a quantitative assessment with fuzzy 
inputs. This leads to an impression of an exactness that is rarely there. Such a false sense of certainty 
often leads to bad decisions being made. Because of the difficulty getting quantitative measures for 
XSEDE (impact is often not financial but to reputation, loss of cycles, availability, etc) and the fact that the 
budget is fixed for security, we started with a qualitative approach. This especially makes sense for 
XSEDE, where the main goal of this risk assessment is to inform prioritization of limited resources to 
deploy the countermeasures that give the best cost benefit. 
Significant threats were written up with a one page scenario by an expert (w.r.t. the asset being 
threatened) with guidance from the security analyst. These scenarios discussed how the threat could be 
carried out and the potential impact. Help was needed from all the stakeholders, especially to understand 
the impact of threats to assets and business processes. Predicting the likelihood of a threat being realized 
was easier for the analyst to do alone, since it is tied closely to an understanding of the vulnerabilities, but 
it was still reviewed by other technical domain leaders with experience operating the infrastructure as a 
reality check. 
The NIST 800-30 process, CMU created OCTAVE and Australian AS/NZS 4360:2004 are common risk 
assessment methodologies. We used the NIST 800-30 process this for many reasons. First, each of 
these build upon the previous and no time is wasted by starting with the NIST method, expanding to the 
OCTAVE approach, and finally moving onto the Australian/New Zealand standard (now superseded by 
the ISO 31000 series). In fact, many professionals recommend that an organization get their feet wet with 
the NIST approach first simply because it is a lot to tackle everything at once to start with the deepest and 
most sophisticated approach. Second, the OCTAVE approach relies heavily upon a series of self-directed 
workshops with management, operations, security and business heads walking through several 
scenarios, questionnaires and checklists. This is a significant commitment from the whole organization 
that XSEDE was unlikely to make as a whole. And even if it did want to, it would have been hard to do 
with teams so geographically distributed. Therefore, we started with the NIST 800-30 process, which 




Once the risk assessment was finished and we figured out which risks to mitigate (through specific 
countermeasures), accept, transfer or avoid, then we made security plans2 for subsequent years based 
on the assessment. 
One of the first actions was creating new policies for XSEDE. While policies, standards, baselines, 
guidelines and procedures are all a part of a security policy architecture, they are distinct. A security 
policy is an overall statement produced, or at least endorsed, by senior management which dictates the 
role security plays in the organization. These are very high-level and focus on high-level goals, roles and 
responsibilities and the acceptable level of risk in an organization. Policies should be very stable over 
time. Standards are mandatory actions, activities or rules. Standards describe how a policy is realized in 
practice and may refer to specific technologies or processes to be followed. Guidelines are similar to 
standards but are recommended. Finally, procedures are low-level how-to's for implementing the 
standards or guidelines. 
The technical countermeasures selected in the final step of the risk assessment fed into the security 
blueprints. These blueprints lay out the solutions and components needed to fulfill XSEDE's security 
needs, and are reflected in several SDI activities, though without formally introducing the term security 
blueprint. In XSEDE, these blueprints did not come wholly from the risk assessment process but were 
also be influenced by what was promised to program officers and stakeholders. In general, it should be 
possible map to the controls in the blueprints to security controls in the ISO 17799 Part 1 or the newer 
ISO 27000 series, though a specific effort was not made to do this formally. 
XSEDE does not have a formal security architecture, which is often developed for products seeking 
certain certifications like the NIST FIPS program. Such an architecture would connect the security policies 
formally to a set of mechanisms to realize the policy in a formal method. 
  
                                                     
2 Mitigation is usually through technical countermeasures, and avoidance is usually through policy and procedure. Transferring risk, 
usually involves insuring against a threat, something XSEDE is very unlikely to do. Acceptance does not mean ignoring. It means a 
risk is acknowledged determined by senior management not viable to reduce or avoid. 
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03: Risk Assessment Project Sizing 
Background & Purpose 
We perform a threat and risk assessment for XSEDE to: 
1. inform future security plans; 
2. prioritize resources of the security operations team and its activities; and 
3. demonstrate a process for service providers to use in their security planning. 
Scope 
A risk assessment can be scoped both in terms of threats and assets considered. We, the XSEDE 
security team, perform risk assessments at the federation-level and then leave it to individual Service 
Providers (SPs) to follow a similar process for their local XSEDE resources. We consider threats that 
affect more than one site, the fundamental shared resources of XSEDE, or the underlying trust fabric. For 
example, threats specific to the architecture of a particular HPC would not be considered here, but threats 
against an XSEDE authentication system (e.g., Kerberos KDC) would be. 
The most general kind of risk assessment would consider all sorts of threats, including environmental, 
application error, physical failure and disasters. However, our goal is namely to wisely choose cyber 
security controls to give us the most bang for our buck. Therefore, we only consider cyber security 
threats, such as, application errors and insider/outsider threats (e.g., i.e. hacking, cracking and attacks). 
So while hackers stealing credentials will are considered, fires at a particular site's data center are not. 
Resources 
The initial risk assessment took 1 year to complete and required a whole team with representation from 
every major operations group led by a security analyst. Updates every couple of years require much less 
time and resources, typically a security analyst dedicating a fraction of their time over a few months and 
support from the XSEDE Security Working Group. 
Approach 
The NIST 800-30 risk assessment approach was chosen for several reasons as described in 02: A Risk-
based Security Program for XSEDE. The risk assessment updates will proceed in the same order through 
the same 10 steps as the original, with the security analyst updating each section, waiting for feedback 
from the XSEDE Security Working Group, incorporating feedback, and then moving on to the next step. 





04: XSEDE System Characterization 
(2019 Note: Some links in this document may not be active due to their target in the old XSEDE Wiki 
which has been replaced by https://confluence.xsede.org. Several Wiki links do not have corresponding 
Confluence links.) 
The first step of any risk assessment is to concretely define the boundaries of the system(s) that you are 
evaluating. This keeps later steps, such as identifying threats and vulnerabilities, much more focused. It 
also provides a systematic way to break up the evaluation of threats and vulnerabilities by logical areas 
that can be delegated to the most appropriate person(s). 
This is a federation-wide risk assessment, which may in the future need to reference individual site-level 
risk assessments for more detail. We, however, do not have the expertise or resources to evaluate risks 
to individual compute resources at the different service providers. 
That said, the purpose of this phase is to identify the boundaries of the "system", along with the 
resources, organizations and information that constitute the system. This includes identifying the system's 
mission; major hardware components; key software and services; data and information with sensitivity 
assessment; user and support communities (includes XSEDE staffing groups as well as resource 
providers); logical network topology; system interfaces (both internal and external connectivity); flow of 
information (particularly if sensitive); references to existing security architecture and policy 
documentation; and management and monitoring controls (e.g., availability monitoring, intrusion detection 
systems). 
System Mission 
XSEDE's mission is to substantially enhance the productivity of a growing community of researchers, 
engineers, and scholars through access to advanced digital services that support open research. 
Users 
Broadly speaking, our users are principal investigators (PIs) or students/researchers working for PIs. PIs 
are research scientists or educators at a U.S. institution. Most, but not all PIs, are current grant holders 
from the NSF. 
Besides allocations given to XSEDE staff for testing and development purposes, there are three basic 
types of allocations: startup, education and research. Startup allocations are smaller allocations that are 
primarily used by first time XSEDE users and are not hard to get. Many universities have XSEDE campus 
champions who can help people get start-up allocations. Education allocations are for classes or training 
at workshops and such. The primary and main use of the systems is for research allocations whose 
requests are reviewed at quarterly XRAC meetings. These are longer-lived and higher priority as this is 
where the science is done that fulfills the primary mission of XSEDE. 
Users have many issues and concerns, though the primary security concerns will be availability and 
integrity of their data and results. If there is doubt about the integrity of their data or results, the work is 
useless, and hence that is the primary concern. However, resources that are unavailable due to outages 
or security incidents are nearly as problematic as many jobs require long runs without interruption. 
Concerns about confidentiality likely come in third for most users as XSEDE is used for fundamental 
research which is generally open, and not for private sector uses that have more proprietary concerns. An 
institution may provide an HPC that serves both, but it is unlikely that the private sector customer is an 
actual XSEDE user using an XSEDE allocation and is thus tangent to this risk assessment. 




For this subsection, please refer to the organizational chart below (current Dec. 2011). 
XSEDE is led by a project director who receives input and direction from the several stakeholders: the 
National Science Foundation (NSF), the XSEDE Advisory Board (XAB), the User Advisory Committee, 
the XD Service Providers Forum, and the XSEDE Project office (which the director leads). The project 
office members cover 6 areas: External Relations (aka, public affairs), Industry Relations, Systems & 
Software, Architecture & Design, Project Management, and Software Development & Integration. 
Besides the project office, there are 5 additional areas led by level 2 managers. These are Operations, 
User Services, Advanced User Support Projects, Advanced User Support Communities, and Education & 
Outreach. The XSEDE Senior Management Team is led by the project director and consists of the level 2 
managers plus some additional members of the project office. It currently includes the directors of 
Operations, Users Services, Extended Collaborative Support Services-Projects, Extended Collaborative 
Support Services-Communities, Education and Outreach, the Senior Project Manager, the Senior 




From Concept to Deployment 
The parts of the organization that affect the design, deployment and operation of XSEDE systems and 
services are of primary concern to this system security risk assessment, though clearly failures in other 
divisions can introduce project risks, if not cybersecurity risks. For example, the failure of the education 
and outreach program or public affairs could easily derail future refunding efforts. 
The teams responsible for design, deployment and operation of systems are the Systems & Software 
Engineering Team (SSE), the Architecture & Design Team (AD), the Software Development and 
Integration Team (SDI) and the Operations group. The general process followed is that SSE defines the 
requirements, holds the baselines, and interfaces with the advisory committees to gather the information 
they need. They also are responsible for ensuring that XSEDE uses best system and software 
engineering practices across the full life-cycle of engineering effort. Requirements and baselines are fed 
into the design process which is then carried out by the AD team, hopefully, with back and forth feedback 
between SSE and the AD teams. SDI is then responsible for detailed design, development, and 
integrated testing. Anything new must fit into an existing ecosystem, and SDI is supposed to get any new 
services ready for development with an integration plan for Operations. Finally, Operations works with 
SDI to deploy new technologies and runs them on a day-to-day basis. Most actual software development 
occurs in SDI, though lines are in practice a little blurrier than described above. 
Staff Demographics 
Staff for XSEDE are professionals and academics primarily located research universities or DOE labs 
with HPC resources. There is a strong correlation between the major XSEDE service providers and the 
location of staff, and hence staff are spread out quite a bit geographically (primarily at NICS, TACC, 
NCSA, UChicago, IU, and PSC). Staff include developers, system admins, project managers, post docs, 
faculty and more. 
Because of geographic disparity, most communication is in person at quarterly meetings or on the many 
conference calls and emails. The fact that staff is so spread and so numerous is important to note, as it 
does lend itself more readily to miscommunication and social engineering attacks. 
Service Providers 
The relationship between XSEDE and various partners range from tightly-coupled (e.g., those providing 
central services and XRAC allocated compute resources), to loosely coupled (e.g. providers of a limited 
set of XSEDE compatible services), to peripheral (e.g. entities only wanting to make the services they 
provide visible to the XSEDE community). As such, Service Providers (SPs) are categorized into a tiered 
system with representation on the Service Providers Forum (SPF) which in turn will have representation 
on the XSEDE Advisory Board (XAB). How much representation an SP has in the SPF is determined by 
which of the three tiers it resides in, which in turn is defined by the minimum requirements they meet and 
agree to in formal agreements with XSEDE. 
SPs classified as Level 1 Service Providers have the deepest level of commitment and integration with 
XSEDE and the XSEDE environment, and they explicitly share digital services with the broader 
community of users of the XSEDE environment and infrastructure making use of XSEDE services and 
interfaces. Level 2 Service Providers make one or more digital services accessible via XSEDE services 
and interfaces, and share one or more digital services with the XSEDE community along with the 
organization's local users. Level 3 Service Providers are the most loosely coupled; they will advertise the 
characteristics of one or more digital services via XSEDE mechanisms, might make those resources or 
services accessible via XSEDE compatible interfaces, and are not required to share them with the 
XSEDE user community. 
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Level 1 SPs are tightly integrated and provide some of the core cyber-infrastructure for XSEDE in addition 
to the major HPC resources. Certainly, those providing cyber-infrastructure, such as shared filesystems 
and Authentication/Authorization services, should perform their own risk assessments for a complete 
understanding of XSEDE risks. However, even those not providing shared cyber-infrastructure but just 
HPC resources should also do risk assessments since (1) they are automatically trusted more being on 
XSEDENet, (2) tight integration means their failure could have unexpected system-wide implications, and 
(3) failure of key resources impairs the mission of XSEDE, and (4) the public often does not differentiate 
these sites from XSEDE which means a security incident at any major SP affects the reputation of 
XSEDE as a whole. 
Level 2 resources are not running key resources or core cyber-infrastructure, but they often do have 
some special integration with XSEDE. Furthermore, they will often install pieces of the XSEDE software 
stack and thus depend on XSEDE's security to some extent. XSEDE does not gain much additional risk 
from these partners, but they may gain a little risk by integrating into XSEDE. However, it is hard to make 
such blanket statements as each of the level 2 agreements and integration points are likely to be unique. 
Therefore, while it is not practical or necessary for each level 2 resource to perform a risk assessment of 
their own for submission, security operations in XSEDE must be aware of these integrations ahead of 
time and part of the approval process for connecting new resources. 
Level 3 SPs are expected to be mostly just listed through the XSEDE portal or some other directory, while 
operating quite independently. They pose little to no risk to XSEDE. If they do make resources available 
through XSEDE interfaces, that mechanism should be understood and approved by the XSEDE security 
operations team, but there is no need for individual risk assessments of these SPs. 
Based on current (Feb. 2014) information, we have the following level 1 SPs, none of which have done 
individual risk assessments for XSEDE. 
● NICS (National Institute for Computational Sciences) 
● PSC (Pittsburgh Supercomputing Center) 
● SDSC (San Diego Supercomputing Center) 
● TACC (Texas Advanced Computing Center) 
Systems & Services 
Each major type of system or support service for XSEDE is listed in this section with links to where we 
describe (1) the data and information on the system, (2) the flow of any of that data between systems, 
and (3) the relevant interfaces to the system or service. In particular, with the data we want to identify any 
sensitive data and whether or not it cross organizational or trust boundaries. System interfaces could be 
either internal backend interfaces where credentials are passed, or more external interfaces like a shell 
access exposed through a login node. For any identified data flows, there must be some corresponding 
system interface(s) listed. 
Details about these services can be found in Appendix A. 
SERVICE NOTES 
Level 1 SP Compute and Storage Resources HPCs and archives 
AMIE Backend for XDCDB 
CI Logon  
CI Tutor www.citutor.org 
Cornell Virtual Workshop www.cac.cornell.edu 
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XSEDE.org DNS  
Conference Call System Lync 
E-Mail List Server  
Genesis II STS & RNS servers 
Globus Listener globus-usage.teragrid.org 
Globus Online www.globusonline.org 
Metrics for IIS info-metrics.xsede.org 
Integrated Information Services info.xsede.org 
INCA inca.xsede.org 
Jira jira.xsede.org 
Karnak Predictor karnak.xsede.org 
XSEDE Kerberos Realm  
MyProxy Certificate Authorities myproxy.xsede.org 
Nagios Service nagios.xsede.org 
OAuth OAuth redirect on portal site 
Openfire Secure Jabber Server For incident response communication 
perfSONAR Network monitoring 
Resource Description Repository rdr.xsede.org 
RSA SecurID  
RT Ticket System tickets.xsede.org 
Sciforma projects.xsede.org 
Security Wiki For incident response 
SharePoint Reporting wiki 
Single SignOn Hub login.xsede.org 
Source Repository software.xsede.org 
Speedpage speedpage.psc.edu 
User Profile Service  
XDCDB Central Database xdcdb.xsede.org 
XRAS Service Proposal system 
XSEDE User Portal, KnowledgeBase, Web Site and Wiki www.xsede.org 
 





The diagram above shows the 10,000 ft view of XSEDEnet, a high-speed, wide-area backplane used for 
perfsonar, gridftp and other large transfers between large XSEDE SPs. Each site uses its own set of 10G 
fiber links to connect to their local POP< and the backbone is provided through Internet2. 
XSEDEnet does not own any of its own network equipment, rather this is all owned by our service 
provider, Internet2. Of course, the SPs own the router endpoints in their own data centers. XSEDEnet 
also has a dedicated /25 IP space donated by NCSA, though each site uses their own IP space to 
advertise their resources into XSEDEnet as needed. SPs are only supposed to advertise routes for 
addresses of XSEDE specific resources on XSEDEnet, and the other XSEDE sites prefer routes over 
XSEDEnet to those resources. As such, there is some implicit trust and most sites do not run any firewalls 
or perform any extra monitoring on XSEDEnet. However, each site can make its own decision here, and 
some sites (e.g., NCSA) will monitor the XSEDEnet like any other WAN connections. Therefore, the risk 
from compromise of XSEDEnet is better evaluated one level lower at the individual SPs. 
XSEDEnet is also not critical to XSEDE in that sites should fail-over to other research and education 
network links (at a cost to performance possibly). However, that has not been tested in practice. 
Finally, it should be noted that XSEDEnet is meant primarily for Level 1 SPs. Level 3 partners won't use 
XSEDEnet, and some level 2 SPs do not use it. 
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Management & Monitoring Controls 
Management structure and lines of authority for XSEDE are described above in the "XSEDE Staff" 
section. Procedural controls related to security are described in the incident handling playbook and other 
documents below under "Existing Standards and Policies". Environmental controls, contingency and 
recovery controls, personnel and physical security controls are largely absent or not applicable to 
XSEDE. 
For each particular system and service, we indicate management interfaces available to XSEDE staff in 
the "System Interfaces" sub sections. However, many of these services are monitoring controls 
themselves at a higher-level. These monitor the state and availability of critical resources such as HPC 
systems and network links and include: perfSONAR, IIS, Metrics for IIS, INCA, Speedpage, Globus 
Listener, Karnak Predictor, and the User Profile Service. 
XSEDE Software Stack 
This section identifies key pieces of software, such as toolkits and services, run at different service 
providers (SPs). What isn't included are local customizations, particulars of base OS'es and other 
software run at the individual sites that would need to be addressed in individual, site-specific risk 
assessments. Instead we are focused on software (e.g., Globus Toolkit, Unicore, etc) and configurations 
(e.g., the XSEDE trust store of certificates and Common User Environment) that are configured in XSEDE 
specific ways to support the XSEDE services layer in the XSEDE architecture. Much of this content is 






Registration Services Partial The Core Integration Capability Kit must be installed on all SPs 
and includes tools (pacman, and ctss-core-registration) 
needed to publish information back to Integrated Information 
Services regarding the capabilities of each SP, i.e. what 
resources they provide. 
Additional registration subcomponents that are required 
include data movement client/server registration, local 
compute registration, login service registration, and 
visualization tool registration. 
Other registration services are optional. This includes 
application runtime and development support, distributed 
programming systems, local hpc software, meta-scheduling 
registration, co-scheduling, parallel application, remote 
compute (job submission), science gateway, DC-WAN Lustre, 
and workflow system registration. 
INCA Yes INCA client to allow verification of registered services at the 
SP. 




Globus Toolkit Partial Globus Toolkit is a suite of tools provided by the Globus team 
at http://globus.org/toolkit/. Not all of these tools are required 
for XSEDE SPs, but GridFTP servers for file transfer, globus-
url-copy (the corresponding gridftp client tool), GSI OpenSSH 
(which supports X.509 certificates), and a MyProxy client (to 
request X.509 certificates) are required. Other Globus Toolkit 
client components are optional, such as, and GRAM 
XSEDE CA Tarball Yes There is a set of certificate authorities which all XSEDE SPs 
are supposed to install and trust for GridFTP and GSI 
OpenSSH interoperability. These are maintained in a tarball in 
a subversion repository at software.xsede.org. 
UberFTP Yes UberFTP is a gridFTP client developed at NCSA. 
Globus-wsrf Yes This refers to the web services resource framework container 
for the Globus services such as GRAM. This does not mean 
that the services themselves must be installed at the SPs 
XSEDE Glue2 Publishing Yes The XSEDE GLUE2 component is a module that publishes 
GLUE 2.0 specified information thru information services at 
each SP. We aggregate all the SP GLUE 2.0 information into 
central information services for use by the Condor meta-
scheduler and other software components. 
Local Resource 
Management System 
Partial This refers to the various local job schedulers (e.g., Cobalt, 
Condor, LSF, Load Leveler, Moab, PBS Pro, PBS Torque, and 
SGE). Supported schedulers should be registered with ctss-
local-compute-registration. Not each and every one of these 
workload management services need to be available at every 
SP. 
gx-map Yes A tool for requesting updates to the gridmap file to associate 
new distinguished names with a user account name. 
xdusage Yes This is a command line tool that allows users to see the status 
of their current allocations. 
Modules Yes Modules is the XSEDE standard environment management 
tool. It is often used to manage multiple versions of software 
and supports most shells and some scripting languages. See 
http://modules.sourceforge.net/ for more information. 
tgproxy Yes This software manages the location and naming conventions 
of user proxy credentials. 
Common User Environment Yes The Common User Environment (CUE) is a standardization of 
user environment variables aimed at providing a more 
homogenous user experience across XSEDE SPs. 
tginfo No This is a command line tool to query the XSEDE Integrated 
Information Services. 
tgresid No Site, resource, and platform type identification tool. 
SAGA No A library for grid application programming. 
MCP No The Master Control Program (MCP) optimizes application start 
times by submitting multiple copies of an application to 
different resources. Once one copy begins to execute, the 
other copies are deleted. 
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GUR No The GUR (Grid Universal Remote) tool is a python script which 
uses the ssh, scp, or their gsi counterpart commands to help 
users make reservations, compile programs, and co-schedule 
jobs. It can accommodate flexible node range and start/end 
time. 
CommSH No The Community Shell tool is a restricted shell used for 
community accounts for science gateways. Since such users 
have a defined set of allowable actions, a restricted shell can 
be used. This mitigates the risks of having many users share a 
single account. 
Unicore Yes This software provides the basic execution service to XSEDE 
compute resources with the gateway, Unicore X and TSI 
software components. 
Genesis II No In XSEDE Genesis II clients can utilize the Unicore basic 
execution service (BES). This depends on Genesis II root 
name service and secure token service described above. 
GFFS is not currently deployed in XSEDE nor the Genesis II 
native BES. 
 
Teragrid Policies and Procedures 
XSEDE inherited policies from TeraGrid, and they need to be updated. Of particular interest to security 
are TG-4, TG-5 and TG-10, which cover incident response, access control and account policy, 
respectively. Security baselines and security standards can be found at http://security.teragrid.org/. 
XSEDE does have a User Responsibility Form, which is very similar to an Acceptable Use Policy (AUP) 
that most IT service providers have. 
New Policies and Agreements 
In addition to the aforementioned policies that should be updated, there are some others that do not exist 
but maybe should. 
● A federation charter which establishes governance structure, partner rights and mechanisms to 
resolve disputes. 
● A legal, law enforcement and regulatory plan. Bits of this are spelled out in the incident response 
handbook, but the topic is far from completely covered. 
● SP security responsibilities. Any official agreement with SPs should have formal language about 
security relevant responsibilities, just as an AUP for users would. 
● PI agreement. The PIs take on an extra responsibility for their allocations above and behind that 
of an ordinary user. 
Security Architectures 
There is no official security architecture for XSEDE. However, there is a security production baseline for 




XSEDE uses x509 certificates issued by trusted CAs to allow logins, job submission and file transfer. 
There are multiple ways to authenticate to these trusted CAs and get certificates that can be used on a 
users' behalf. Because these certificates can be used at any level 1 SP, the strength of the whole 
authentication system is only as strong as its weakest length. Therefore, we survey the password 
requirements of each entry point to gain a certificate, including all the level 1 SPs, the XSEDE User Portal 
(XUP), InCommon which can be linked to XUP accounts, and the science gateways which create proxy 
certificates for users. 
 
SITE LENGTH COMPLEXITY COMMENTS 
XUP >=8 3 of following: upper, lower, numbers & symbols Uses XD Kerberos 
NCSA >=8 3 of following: upper, lower, numbers & symbols  
NICS 10-12 Digits only Uses RSA One Time 
Passwords 
PSC >=8 3 of following: upper, lower, numbers & symbols  
SDSC 08-08 Must pass cracklib check Not IGTF accredited 
NERSC >=8 Combination of upper and lowercase letters, 
numbers, and at least one special character within 
the first seven positions, and nonnumeric letter or 
symbol in the first and last positions. 
 










N/A N/A Same as XUP as 
account needed there 
DOEGrids N/A N/A User must visit and RA 
in person, cannot get a 
certificate just based on 
password 
ESNet N/A N/A Does not directly give 
out certificates to users 
but certifies other CAs 
like DOEGrids 
IRISGrid N/A N/A User must visit and RA 
in person, cannot get a 




N/A N/A User must visit and RA 
in person, cannot get a 




NIKHEF N/A N/A User must visit and RA 
in person, cannot get a 
certificate just based on 
password 
KEK N/A N/A User must visit and RA 
in person, cannot get a 
certificate just based on 
password 
DigiCert N/A N/A JIM BASNEY PLZ FILL 
IN 
INFN N/A N/A User must visit and RA 
in person, cannot get a 




Public key authentication is not allowed by all SPs, unlike GSI x.509 based authentication. Therefore, 
risks of exposed or shared keys are best addressed in SP-level risk assessments. 
Process & Examples 
● NIST definition of system characterization and example survey 
● Short 1-page table system characterization template 
● Common example risk assessment. It is too low-level for us, but it is also a much simpler system. 




05: Threat Profile 
Purpose and Goals 
This threat profile discusses likely threat sources that may attempt to exercise vulnerabilities of the 
XSEDE trust fabric or shared resources, whether intentional or not. Threat sources considered here are 
humans (insider/outsider threats) or software/application errors that affect more than one XSEDE service 
provider or core shared services. Other threat sources, like natural disasters, are too site specific and 
should be addressed by risk assessments done at the major service providers individually. 
In addition to identifying potential threat sources, an effort is made to estimate the motivations, resources 
and capabilities of such threat sources. We focus upon threat sources that would likely target an 
organization like XSEDE and list threat actions they may take to exercise potential vulnerabilities. We 
specifically note the threat sources not considered here and why they are not. 
The process followed comes from the NIST 800-30 standard for IT security risk assessments. The 
relevant portions of that standard and other threat profiles used as templates are found in the Sources 
Utilized section below. Further, the results of the surveys sent to the tier 1 XSEDE service providers are 
found in Appendix D. These surveys questioned security teams at those organizations about past 
Teragrid relevant security incidents as well as potentially new threats with XSEDE. The information from 
those surveys informed the table in Appendix C. This table maps threat sources with potential motivation 
with potential actions against XSEDE entities, and it informs much of the text of this document. It also 
tries to discern already seen or expected threats from those that are unlikely but could possibly exploit 
XSEDE vulnerabilities. 
The results of the surveys and other content may be sensitive, and therefore must not be exported with 
this page and shared externally. Nothing directly contained within this threat profile is sensitive, but 
permission must be sought from the XSEDE CSO before sharing it externally. 
Human Cyber Threats 
From experience in Teragrid and the first 4 years of XSEDE, along with the consideration that our user's 
data is for open scientific research, we expect three kinds of human threat sources in XSEDE: crackers, 
computer criminals, and insiders. 
Crackers 
Crackers, often referred to as hackers, come in a range of skill-levels with varying motivations. The most 
common, and least worrisome, is the script-kiddie, who has a very low skill-level. Often, they do not even 
know how to program. By virtue of being on the Internet, we are exposed to constant script-kiddie attacks, 
such as, port scanning and dictionary-based SSH attacks against hosts. However, not all crackers are so 
unskilled as FBI Major Incident 216 showed the Teragrid community in 2004. A very skilled and 
determined teenager from Sweden appears to have single-handedly cost thousands of man-hours of 
incident response time across many sites with his constant attacks over the span of 14 months. Several 
sites had to go offline or reset all user passwords. 
Motivation is hard to determine for any particular incident, especially if it does not result in an arrest. Most 
often crackers are motivated by ego, the challenge, rebellion or some form of activism. We have not seen 
much if any activism motivating attacks in XSEDE or Teragrid. Activists usually deface sites or tell you 
why they hacked you. They want publicity. While some survey respondents noted the rise in hacktivism 
elsewhere with LulzSec, Anonymous and others, we have not seen it in our community yet. Furthermore, 
XSEDE as service provider of open scientific research resources just doesn't attract hacktivism like a 
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federal lab or .gov site might. Unless XSEDE resources start being used for more politically sensitive work 
(perhaps climate change modeling), it seems unlikely that this risk will change significantly. 
The most commonly seen problems from crackers, and ones likely to continue, are dictionary-based and 
credential harvesting attacks. Dictionary-based attacks that attempt thousands of passwords are noisy 
and only rarely successful. They typically succeed where services are poorly configured, and they usually 
represent the actions of script kiddies. The more advanced attacker has the more common MO that we 
see in the most common type of incident. The pattern is as follows. Credentials are harvested, often at a 
non-XSEDE resource. This password is then used to login to an XSEDE resource where upon a local 
privilege escalation attack is perpetrated. This may mean waiting for the next Linux zero-day exploit, at 
which point we see root escalation from potentially multiple accounts. The next step is often to trojan 
another service to either keep a foothold or start harvesting more credentials. Then the cycle repeats. 
This particular threat is unlikely to end or abate any time soon unless password and publickey 
authentication is removed as an acceptable SSH login method, or interactive shell access is no longer 
available to users. 
There are several other common threat actions that crackers may take but that are less likely. They may 
deface web sites, perform cross-site scripting to try to install malware on user workstations, socially 
engineer our accounting or administrative processes, use our hosts as proxies to hide behind, or use our 
systems as a foothold to monitor the private and trusted XDNet. None of these actions were reported as 
likely by survey respondents. It has been noted that HPCs can be particularly useful at cracking 
passwords, and in the distant past at least one was used to do so. However, this has not been seen in a 
very long time, probably because passwords are much easier to crack on commodity devices now, and 
few outsiders actually know anything about submitting HPC jobs or writing code for them. 
Computer Criminals 
While the term computer criminal is not completely mutually exclusive of the label cracker, we attempt to 
make a distinction here because their motivations and resources are different enough. Furthermore, the 
types of threat actions they may take differ enough to justify separate discussion. Being motivated 
primarily by direct monetary gain or perhaps use of a high-powered attack platform, the actions they take 
may differ. Also, criminal organizations often hire many skilled programmers for their maleficence. This 
could mean that they have many more resources to throw into an attack if it is directly targeted. 
Fortunately, there is a lot of low-hanging-fruit and it is not usually in their interest to focus on a single 
adversary. Their strategy is usually breadth-first, gathering as many small hosts as possible from many 
locations. 
Cyber criminals most commonly are found "bot-herding", where they make large untargeted attacks to 
gain as many hosts as possible, which they collect as a commodity resource. They may do this through 
attacks seeking to exploit remote vulnerabilities or by dictionary-based password guessing against 
services like SSHD. As with crackers, the main defense against this threat source is a well-maintained 
and well-configured system. Cyber-criminals can also follow the more involved steps described earlier for 
crackers, that is, harvest credentials, perform a local privilege escalation, and install a trojan, backdoor or 
malware. The difference here is that the malware they install is often for activities like spamming, hosting 
illegal content or performing DDoS (distributed Denial-of-Service) attacks. 
Just as with crackers, they could perform social engineering or simply be looking for proxies to hide 
behind, though this has not been a noted activity of cyber criminals in XSEDE or Teragrid to date. Just 
like crackers, these adversaries typically aren't very aware of HPC environments and are not specifically 
targeting HPCs for their potential. That has been the case to date, but some other HPC sites have seen a 
targeted type of activity whereby attackers would submit hidden jobs that perform bitcoin mining (a way to 
earn virtual, anonymous currency by performing computations) on HPCs (This happened in XSEDE 
recently, but by an insider and not a traditional cyber criminal). These were targeted attacks by persons 
with more domain specific knowledge than most. This new revenue stream does change the economics 
and increase the risk of future targeted attacks against XSEDE resources by cyber criminals. While it has 
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been supposed in the past that these powerful machines with high bandwidth could be targeted by 
criminals to use as DoS tools, this has never really been realized as a threat. It is probably because 
DDoS attacks on commodity machines are easy enough to gather, just as effective, and harder to block 
at the network level. 
Insiders 
Insiders are either XSEDE employees or users who already possess valid credentials to access XSEDE 
resources. Someone could be motivated to do harm if they are a disgruntled or former employee. 
However, no one has provided an example of that happening in Teragrid or XSEDE. An insider could also 
violate policy or exceed their authorizations simply because they are motivated by curiosity about 
another's research or personal information. Examples of this are rare but have happened. Most 
commonly "insiders" aren't motivated per se but are responsible for unintentional errors which still cause 
threats to system stability and security. Someone could simply be negligent, poorly trained or have made 
a programming or configuration error which affects the availability, confidentiality or integrity of an XSEDE 
system. The exception to this was the purposeful mining of bitcoins by a staff member and PI. This did 
not harm the system but was an intentional action that misused resources for personal gain. 
The most common threat actions seen by insiders in the past were unintentional system bugs or 
misconfigurations, which have overly exposed data or negatively affected availability of a resource. Some 
users have been found trying to browse another user's data, though rarely. Such threats could be realized 
through similar privilege escalation and trojaning attacks seen from other threat sources. Those surveyed 
have not seen or expected system sabotage or data corruption/deletion, though that is always a potential 
threat from insiders. Other possible but unlikely insider threats include blackmail, malware inserted to 
infect other users, or interception and monitoring of local network traffic. 
Software & Configuration Threats 
Software errors and configuration threats were touched upon under the category of human insider 
threats, but they could also be categorized by themselves separately. They are a different enough kind of 
threat that they probably merit a separate discussion. While such threats sources often have an insider 
responsible, such as a system administrator or programmer for XSEDE, it need not be tied to an insider, 
and hence it becomes somewhat detached from the notion of a human actor. For example, XSEDE may 
depend on software that it does not develop, and the quality and support of such software may very much 
impact the stability and security of XSEDE. If a key piece of software has an exploit against it in the wild, 
XSEDE Operations staff need to be sure that the party responsible will quickly respond with appropriate 
patches or remedies. More indirectly, software without an exploit that is just unreliable reduces the 
reliability and stability of XSEDE, and hence it becomes a security concern as availability of resources is 
a pillar of security. Finally, it is possible that software used is simply out dated or completely unsupported. 
There is no real human actor behind such a threat source, unless you want to say that the threat source 
is an inept system administrator. However, that may not be fair as we may simply be stuck with the 
software for historical reasons. But such risks still need to be identified and mitigated if possible, and 
issues with major software libraries like OpenSSL have only made this issue more relevant in recent 
years. 
Threats & Threat Sources Out of Scope 
As we say in 03: Risk Assessment Project Sizing, this is a narrowly scoped security risk assessment. We 
are only considering insider/outsider threats (e.g., hacking, cracking, attacks, etc.) and 
software/application errors. We do not address physical or environmental threats. This is because we are 
doing a federation-level risk assessment focused on threats that affect core/shared services and more 
than one service provider. Natural disasters, physical threats and threats specific to individual HPCs 
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would all be best addressed one layer lower with risk assessments done by the service providers 
themselves more directly. 
There are some other threats we don't consider simply because we do not have the assets that would be 
targeted. In particular, industrial espionage is not a threat considered here because XSEDE is not using 
or producing commercial intellectual property. This work is geared towards open, scientific research for 
the NSF. While some sites may sell cycles to industry, and thus have to worry about industrial espionage, 
it is not an XSEDE specific threat. The only effect on XSEDE is the unavailability of specific resources 
shared by XSEDE and industry partners at specific sites, and the impact of that threat on the availability 
of resources is site-specific and best determined at lower-level per site risk assessments. 
Finally, there are some threats that are simply not possible to address in the open environment of XSEDE 
or with the resources it has. For example, a directed attack from a nation state actor would be such an 
asymmetric threat that we could not protect against it. If we are lucky, we might be able to detect such 
attacks, but even that is questionable. Procedures to protect both technically and socially against nation 
states would be far too draconian even if we did have the resources. Furthermore, there is little gain for 
nation states or terrorists to attack XSEDE. We have no critical infrastructure and no loss of life or major 
monetary damage could be brought against the United States by bringing XSEDE offline. 
Summary Statement 
The threats to XSEDE largely have not changed from the threats to Teragrid, besides some increased 
risk of credential harvesting with many additional tier 3 resources expected to join. Therefore, our 
historical data can intelligently inform our threat profile going forward. We expect the most common 
problem to continue to be credential harvesting, followed by privilege escalation, then trojaning, and 
finally more credential harvesting. This threat is unlikely to change without major changes to 
authentication mechanisms and/or user interfaces. We will continue to see many, mostly unsuccessful 
dictionary-based attacks as well as bot-herding for criminal activities. We anticipated and saw a new 
threat action of bitcoin-mining. Other than that, our biggest threats are misconfigurations or software 
errors that must be addressed through configuration management and good software engineering 
practices. Fortunately, we avoid some of the threats seen against other sites by the nature of the 
customers we serve. However, if that ever changes and we start serving more private industry with 
valuable intellectual property, governments with classified data or researchers working on politically hot 
topics, we will have to reevaluate our threat profile. 
Sources Utilized 
● Threat Profile Process from NIST 
● Blue Waters threat profile 
● Early Phase Blue Waters threat assessment 
Threat Profile Survey  
We used surveys sent to the tier 1 XSEDE SPs to gather historical data. The survey questions and 




06: Vulnerability Identification 
A vulnerability is a flaw or weakness in system security procedures, design, implementation or internal 
controls that could potentially be exercised by a threat agent to result in a breach or violation of the 
system's security policy. In this step of the risk assessment we identify as many federation-level 
vulnerabilities in XSEDE as we can, mapping each vulnerability to a threat action and threat source where 
possible. If there is no corresponding threat, we can ignore the vulnerability in further stages of the risk 
assessment. 
Survey 
Questions are asked of the XSEDE Security Working Group members and representatives of each area 
in XSEDE operations. The purpose is to identify as many security vulnerabilities in XSEDE as possible, 
and the corresponding threats which could exercise these vulnerabilities (See examples in the table 
below). In future steps, we will add probability and impact to each item in the table, thus creating a set of 
XSEDE risks. However, this step is about completeness, and we are trying to enumerate all vulnerabilities 
that we can, regardless of the likelihood or impact. 





Terminated employees’ system 
identifiers (ID) are not removed 
from the system 
Terminated 
employees 
Dialing into the company's network and 
accessing company proprietary data 
Company firewall allows inbound 










Using telnet to XYZ server and browsing 
system files with the guest ID 
The vendor has identified flaws in 
the security design of the system; 
however, new patches have not 









Obtaining unauthorized access to sensitive 




Data center uses water sprinklers 
to suppress fire; tarpaulins to 
protect hardware and equipment 




Water sprinklers being turned on in the data 
center 
Identified Vulnerabilities 
Below is a table of all vulnerabilities known or ones that can be reasonably inferred (e.g., there may be no 
known user portal vulnerability, but it is safe to assume any complex web site can be compromised). 
Information was gathered by investigating assets from 04: XSEDE System Characterization, reviewing 
other risk assessments, interviews with people from each operations domain, and review and acceptance 
by the risk assessment team. Each row of this table contains a vulnerability, a threat source taken from 
05: Threat Profile, and an actual threat that would exercise the vulnerability. As Shon Harris states, "a risk 
is the likelihood of a threat agent taking advantage of a vulnerability and the corresponding business 
impact." Therefore, each of these numbered rows were mapped to at least one risk as we added 
likelihood and impact analysis in future steps. 
It is worth noting that XSEDE has an existing Risk Register. This was created separate from this exercise 
and not by a formal process. Furthermore, its scope is much more general. Once this security risk 
























Science Gateway accounts are 
shared. Incident response involving 
gateway accounts may require the 
assistance of a third party if 
appropriate attributes are not 
passed along, thus allowing 
attackers to better obfuscate their 
identity. 






only as strong 
as the weakest 
SP. 
Crackers Through use of x.509 certificates, 
users have single-sign-on 
capabilities to move between level 1 
SP resources. The requirements for 
authentication mechanisms, identity 
vetting and operating a CA between 
SPs are different, making the whole 
system only as strong as the 
weakest link. However, all the CAs 
are IGTF accredited now, and the 
password policies are roughly 
equivalent among the XUP and level 
1 SPs. So while an attacker might 
L L 1 Low 2 
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leverage a slightly weaker password 
standard at one site, the bigger risk 
is from reliance on passwords which 





system which is 












A few services (e.g., Sharepoint and 
CI Tutor) use one-off authentication 
systems separate from the XSEDE 
kerberos and CA systems. Users 
could exploit the fact that disabling 
an XSEDE kerberos account does 
not deactivate these, and 
adversaries could exploit unknown 
vulnerabilities in these outside 
authentication systems if users 
synchronize their passwords for the 
portal and these. 















Having a lower level of assurance in 
the user's identity there is potential 
for a person to impersonate another 
or supply false contact information. 
This makes it difficult to always hold 
a real person accountable for the 
malicious actions on the system or 
theft of intellectual property. 
M L 5 Low 4 
Cleartext 
authentication is 
used for mail list 
management. 
Cracker Majordomo email lists are managed 
by cleartext passwords in the emails 
and trust the source address for 
authentication. This opens up the 
possibility for eavesdropping, list 
denial of service, exposure of private 
archives, and list hijacking for spam. 






weak or loosely 
managed PINs 
Cracker PINs or passwords aren't used for 
most conferences, and the call 
invitation is in the clear in emails and 
on attendee's calendars. This opens 
XSEDE up to the threat of 
eavesdropping on private meetings. 
M L 5 Low 6 
Self-service 
password resets 
can be used by 
anyone able to 
intercept or 
monitor emails 
Cracker An attacker could try to reset a 
user's account from the portal, 
capturing the email with the reset 
code. Then they could log onto 
resources that the do not have 
access to normally and and/or act as 
M L 5 Low 7 
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another person maliciously. 
Credential 
Management 
            
User credentials 






Kerberos tickets and proxy 
certificate keys are usually 
unencrypted on disk on the HPCs. 
File permissions and short life spans 
are the primary mitigation against 
credential theft in this case. 
Gateways such as GlobusOnline 
which store many more credentials 
have more protections in place. 




private keys to 
access XSEDE 
resources 
Crackers Several services run on the backend 
transferring data to/from the 
XDCDB, IIS, RDR, IIS metrics, etc. 
These often depend on permanent 
SSH keys or GSI certificates to run 
in automated scripts. Depending 
upon the lifetime of these credentials 
and the restrictions on the 
corresponding accounts, an attacker 
who compromises one of these 
systems could steal credentials to 
leverage elsewhere in an attack on 
XSEDE infrastructure. 





their keys and 
may not protect 
them 
adequately. 
Cracker XSEDE doesn't control how users 
protect SSH private keys or keys 
corresponding to their X.509 
certificates on their own systems. 
Keys may be unencrypted, or 
encrypted with poor passphrases. 
This means a compromise on a 
user's system could allow an 
attacker to steal their credentials to 
logon to an XSEDE resource and 
spread their attack. 









Cracker There is no centralized logging for 
XSEDE services. This makes it 
easier for an attacker to erase his 
digital trail. It also makes it more 
difficult for incident response teams 
to investigate a complex attack. 









Cracker DNSSEC is not used for clients and 
inconsistently used for server 
synchronization. This lack of 
authentication could be exploited to 
give false responses or poison 
servers. Besides DoS attacks, this 
could allow man-in-the-middle 
attacks for non-certificate based 
services like regular SSHD and 
default Globus configurations that 
rely on DNS for hostname 
canonicalization. 









lending to the 
possibility 
weaker security 
at some SPs. 
Cracker XSEDE has developed new 
guidelines for system hardening, but 
these are not enforced nor audited 
for compliance. Because of the 
shared trust fabric, XSEDE is again 
only as strong as its weakest link, 
and an attacker could exploit a more 
lenient security posture at one SP to 
spread an attack on XSEDE. 










There are many services and 
systems distributed across XSEDE, 
but there is no centralized backup or 
backup policies for critical 
resources. The hosting usually SP 
determines what if anything is 
backed up. Equipment failure or a 
major security incident could make it 
hard to bring these systems back 
online in a secure state (especially 
since not all sites test their restore 
processes). 









Cracker XSEDE networks and publicly facing 
systems do not utilize any sort of 
intrusion detection systems and 
could be compromised with delayed 
notice. Defacement or disruption of 
the portal, XSEDE's public face, 
would be potentially damaging, and 
lack of monitoring increases the 
exposure time during incidents. 
Given the large bandwidth and 
capabilities of HPCs and perfSonar 
nodes, a sizable amount of damage 
from a DoS attack using XSEDE 
resources could occur in even a 






short amount of time. 
Admins are not 






N/A RETIRED N/A N/A N/A 16 
A critical service 
is vulnerable to 
a denial of 
service attack. 
Cracker Any Internet facing system could be 
vulnerable to a DoS attack, given 
sufficient adversarial resources. 
Even though XSEDE tries to 
mitigate this by having replication 
across multiple sites and redundant 
network paths, it is still possible for 
an adversary to mount such an 
attack, especially against non-
replicated services like the XUP and 
XRAS. 




There is no 
consistent patch 
management 




Cracker RETIRED. We are using Qualys and 
have a program in place now. 
N/A N/A N/A 18 
Privacy             






There is little besides file system 
permissions or ACLs that isolate 
users and their data on most 
XSEDE systems. There is potential 
for such basic mechanisms to be 
overcome and allow data snooping 
by adversaries. When networked 
filesystems are used without 
encryption, this threat is increased. 




Cracker Much of the ticket system 
communication is done over 
plaintext emails. Since some of the 
tickets are sensitive and contain 
security relevant information, 
attackers snooping those emails 
could gain an advantage. 
M L 5 Low 20 
Incident 
response team 
Cracker The Jabber server uses SSL and 
does not log conversations. 




log sensitive IM 
chats. 
However, there is no control over 
the endpoints when using the 
Jabber server for incident response. 
So messages could be logged on 
client hosts and accessed more 
easily or exposed if a laptop is lost. 
This inside information could be 
used for gain by an attacker. 
Software             
Deployed 
software could 
be out of date 
with stale CTSS 
registrations 
info. 
Cracker While there is a common software 
stack for XSEDE compatibility, there 
is an inconsistency across sites on 
versions deployed, with some sites 
using very out-of-date pieces 
software. This affects major software 
and central services less as we are 
using Qualys. However, there is a 
threat that an attacker could 
leverage an exploit at one site to 
gain a foothold at another. 




that has not had 
code audits. 
Cracker Many applets and pieces of software 
for XSEDE have been developed in-
house without code reviews or 
expertise in security. There are likely 
unknown security flaws that could be 
exploited in a targeted attack. This is 
especially true of something as 
complex as the user portal, whose 
compromise would be harmful to 
XSEDE's reputation. 










Crackers Some proprietary protocols have 
been created for services (e.g., 
Globus listener over UDP). 
Developing secure protocols in 
nefariously hard, and in some cases 
there is no indication that any 
encryption or signing has been 
done. A very targeted attacker could 
exploit protocol vulnerabilities in 
ways that are very difficult to detect 
or deter. 
L L 1 Low 24 
XSEDE 
depends upon 
software that is 
no longer 
actively 
Cracker XSEDE depends on some software 
that no longer has active 
development. This means there may 
be no one there to fix security or 
reliability bugs which could be 






supported. exploited maliciously (e.g., gaining 
shell access, privilege escalation or 
DoS), and it has caused migration 
challenges as we have had to move 
to new standards like SHA-2 
certificates. 
Globus Online 
does not follow 
best practices 
with all of their 
key handling. 
Cracker RETIRED. Reasons: GO has 
significantly mitigated the risk of 
exploitation with recommended 
controls, and this is a more specific 
instance of #8 
N/A N/A N/A 26 
There is a zero-
day root 
escalation 
exploit in the 
wild for Linux or 
some common 
piece of the 
XSEDE 
software stack 
Cracker Software vulnerabilities are 
commonly found, and there are are 
often crackers sitting on harvested 
user credentials waiting for the next 
Linux zero-day that would allow 
them to escalate their privileges to 
obtain root on an XSEDE resource. 




There is a 
common 
XSEDE service 
with a remote 
exploit 
Cracker By virtue of having services online, 
there is always a risk that a new 
vulnerability is discovered that 
allows remote exploit that could 
either be combined with a local root 
escalation or that gives root itself. If 
such an exploit is in the wild and 
XSEDE is vulnerable, it is only a 
matter of time before scans by 
crackers discover it and exploit it. 











N/A RETIRED. XSEDE has updated 
policies and produced new ones. 









are now a part 
of XSEDE 
Cracker With inconsistent standards, 
attackers could target grand-
fathered services which might not 
pass security reviews today, though 
many of these are retired or 
replaced in time. 
L M 5 Low 30 
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and the annual 
training for new 
users is optional 
and only 






If users do not know what they 
should and should not do with 
respect to security, it is more likely 
that they can be taken advantage of 
by social engineers and that they do 
not protect their credentials well 
enough. Because we don't audit 
SPs, this makes it more likely that 
XSEDE staff are not following 
security baselines either. Failures to 
implement policy and procedure are 
therefore more likely and could 
result in more downtime and slower 
response to an incident. 








vary and the 




Cracker Different sites are more or less 
prepared to detect and respond to 
incidents, giving adversaries 
strategic options when deciding 
where to attack XSEDE. Being 
geographically and institutionally 
separated, the XSEDE IR team 
members must work harder to 
coordinate activities and overcome 
hurdles with information sharing that 
could slow response. 








and there is no 
regular auditing 
with respect to 
security. 
Cracker As time goes by, systems likely drift 
from more secure and up-to-date 
configurations to less secure states. 
Crackers can target such 
infrastructure and find vulnerabilities 
to exploit more easily. 












With a large complex organizational 
structure with many geographically 
separated employees only part-time 
committed to XSEDE, there is 
increased possibility for inaction or 
slow action at a critical moments. 
This is exacerbated when roles and 
process are unclear and has an 
impact beyond just security, though 
agility is particularly important for 
security. 










oversights' remained will supported in the first 5 
years and is a part of the renewal 
process 





Crackers Crackers can sit on passwords that 
are compromised and wait for 
privilege escalation vulnerabilities. 
These exposures may not even 
happen on XSEDE resources but 
bleed over to XSEDE because of 
password reuse. 




Most SPs have 
not done risk 
assessments 
Cracker Because individual SPs have not 
completed similar risk assessments 
a level lower, XSEDE cannot fully 
understand its risks. We assume the 
physical and cyber security of these 
centers as a starting point, and we 
may miss important vulnerabilities 
that should be addressed 
M L 5 Low 37 




training for staff. 
Cracker Social-engineering is addressed in 
the optional annual user training for 
users help at the XSEDE 
conference. However, staff aren't 
trained to protect against social 
engineering, and it isn't considered 
as a part of most processes. 
Mitigating this though, account 
resets are automated and don't 
require a person in-the-loop anyway, 
and resources are physically spread 
out across many organizations. 
Finally, open scientific research isn't 
often threatened by targeted attacks 
for data. 
L L 1 Low 38 
Passwordless 
remote root 
keys used for 
XWFS 
Cracker The XWFS is configured in a way 
that requires remote root logins 
across sites via passwordless SSH 
keys for GPFS. While some 
mitigations have been in put in 
place, this could allow a root exploit 
to spread across sites undetectably. 




07: Control Analysis Matrix 
In this table we list current or planned security controls with descriptions. The status column uses "E" for 
existing and "P" for planned. The Federation column uses "Y" for appropriate to call a control for the 
federation level risk assessment, "N" is for not appropriate, and "M" is for maybe. Some controls are in a 
gray zone. For example, they may need to be implemented at the SP level, but they should follow policy 
or baselines established at by the federation. For example, local passwords and public keys are used 
differently at different SPs, but that doesn't mean there shouldn't be any sort of baseline as this has an 
effect on the overall security of XSEDE beyond an individual site. The description column tries to point out 
these sorts of ambiguities. 
A source for the list of these controls came from brainstorming, reference to the security controls catalog 
in the NIST Special Publication 800-53, and a review of previously identified controls in 04: XSEDE 
System Characterization. 
 




   
Kerberos E Y The XSEDE Kerberos infrastructure is mostly transparent 
to users, and many probably don't realize their portal 
password is really for a Kerberos principal. Kerberos is 
also used for the single-sign-on hub, the XSEDE MyProxy 
server, and O4MP service used by GlobusOnline. By 
using this control, account management can be 
centralized, and accounts disabled quickly, though existing 
certificates are not automatically revoked when a Kerberos 
principal is disabled. 
PKI E Y The XSEDE PKI includes the IGTF accredited MyProxy 
CAs used by the OA4MP service and SSO Hub, the CI 
Logon infrastructure, the trust store of approved XSEDE 
root certificates, all the existing short-lived certificates for 
XSEDE users, and the set of policies and procedures for 
vetting CAs for the tarball. The policies for how the 
myproxy.xsede.org and CI Logon CAs are managed follow 
from the CPS approved by TAGPMA. The purpose of the 
XSEDE PKI is to allow single-sign-on and use of federated 
identities and to support various grid middleware services. 
It is another type of authentication control that lets XSEDE 
control who can authoritatively vouch for user identities. 
XSEDE no longer manages a PKI for host certificates. 
Certificate 
settings 
E Y Certificate lifetimes and restricted proxy settings are 
important parameters to tune risks with regard to the 
XSEDE PKI. Certificate lifetimes are limited by the CA 
policies and often even shorter by configurations for 
services that request certificates with shorter lifetimes. 
Restricted certificates for GridFTP only are used by 
GlobusOnline. While this is all a part of the PKI, it 




OAuth Service E Y Rather than having external portals request users enter 
XSEDE Kerberos password in their web sites, XSEDE 
provides an OAuth front-end to sites like GlobusOnline. 
This control protects against exposure of credentials at 
non-XSEDE sites and trains users to only enter XSEDE 
credentials at the XSEDE portal. This control centralizes 
web-based authentications for XSEDE users. 
SP passwords, 
OTP & Keys 
E M Users often don't login directly to XSEDE compute 
resources with their XSEDE Kerberos principal, except 
through the SSO Hub. Each site handles authentication 
differently with different technologies and policies. 
Because of the single-sign-on capabilities provided by 
linking these authentication mechanisms with local CAs, 
one could argue XSEDE authentication is only as strong 
as the weakest link. Therefore, these local authentication 
systems are relevant to XSEDE (1) when they can be 
used to get a certificate from a trusted CA and (2) when 
they are used for administrative interfaces of shared 
critical infrastructure. Standard have been made that 
require two-factor for administrators of XSEDE resources, 





E M Protection of private keys and user files is done via file 
system permissions and ACLs. Configurations are unique 
to different hosts administered by different people at 
institutions. For global filesystems and shared critical 
support services, this is definitely a federation-level access 
control. It is less of a federation level-issue for individual 
SP compute and storage resources, except regarding how 
certificates are protected. The latter should be 




E Y While mostly a usability feature, self-service password 
resets can encourage users to choose better or unique 
passwords. Security benefits really depend on how they 
are configured and the alternatives the are compared 




   
Security 
Policies 
E Y There are several security relevant policies, standards and 




E Y Specific procedures (which were approved by TAGPMA) 
have been produced for vetting users and allocating 
accounts. These processes are important for both security 
and accounting. Changes to them should be carefully 
considered as they form the founding assumptions for 
much of the trust fabric within XSEDE, and the 
effectiveness of other controls depend upon them. 
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User Training E/P Y Security operations has developed some using training 
materials for security. However, there is no mandatory or 
targeted security training in XSEDE. There are plans to 
develop more security training materials in the future and 
to find new methods of outreach. The effectiveness of this 
control largely depends upon the ability to reach the 
people who most affect the security of XSEDE. This may 
be developers, system administrators and other XSEDE 





E Y The Systems, Software & Engineering group oversees the 
process of making configuration changes to the baselines 
held by Operations. There are official processes for 
making CI changes consisting of reviews in SD&I and the 
Software Testing & Deployment (STD) group. All changes 
are supposed to go through reviews and testing. This is a 
more general quality control with security implications. 
Security 
Reviews 
E Y Configuration Items (CIs) are supposed to go through 
security reviews in both SD&I and Operations before they 
are deployed by the STD group. The purpose of this 





E Y XSEDE has a formal, risk-based security program. This 
risk assessment is part of a larger risk-based program 
designed to more judiciously apply resources to security. 




E Y XSEDE funds professional incident responders at multiple 
institutions who can quickly investigate security problems 
and work with their contacts at the service providers. This 
control is focused on containment and resolution after a 





E Y XSEDE has formal security related planning activities and 





E Y XSEDE maintains a master registry listing all the services 
provided, ranking them into tiers based upon criticality and 
service-level promises. This is an important list to have 
and keep updated as it tells us where to focus monitoring 





E Y XSEDE does have a formal architecture and baseline for 
one set of security controls, namely those core 
technologies related to authentication and authorization. 
This architecture and baseline is important to refer to 
when integrating any new technologies so that we can 
keep a consistent and unified authN/Z infrastructure. This 
control is necessary with the complexity and sheer number 
or organizations involved. 
Intelligence 
Channels 
E Y In order to share information between sites and so that all 
members of the security working group could subscribe to 
intelligence from REN-ISAC feeds, it is a requirement for 
member organizations to join REN-ISAC. 
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Resiliency    
Offsite 
Redundancy 
E Y Most all of the systems and support services from the 
master registry are replicated across at least two service 
providers. This protects against hardware, environmental 
and some organizational failures. 
Backups E M Each site is doing backups in its own way or not at all. 
There is certainly an XSEDE stake in doing backups for 
shared services. Though there is not any current guideline 








E Y Most services encrypt data in transit and by using SSH, 
HTTPS or other proprietary protocols over SSL. This is 
strongly encouraged or required in the security reviews of 
new CIs especially to protect user credentials, but also to 
authenticate services to users and each other. 
Previous Login 
Notification 
E M Most systems tell users when and from where they 
previously logged in. This control helps detect 
compromised accounts. 
Firewalls E M XSEDENet does not use firewalls. There are no centrally 
planned host or network-based firewalls for XSEDE 
services. Some of the SPs have a combination of both 
host and network firewall services, but these are not 
documented. XSEDE has guidelines or hardening 
requirements for XSEDE central services that include 
rules about host-based firewalls. 
Audit Logging E M There is no centralized syslog server or log management 
system. Each service and each SP handles this differently. 
XSEDE has a baseline standard for audit logging, but this 





E Y There are several support services that utilize databases 
(e.g., AMIE). Some of these provide separate database 
views, employing the principles of least privilege to expose 
only the necessary pieces with the necessary rights to 
particular systems and users. This is a practice 
encouraged in design reviews of new services. 
Secure 
Communicatio
n for IR 
E Y The incident response team is distributed and therefore 
relies upon secure communication channels. They have 
their own private teleconference code, secure IM services, 




E Y The incident response team has its own restricted wiki to 





E Y Security operations has a vulnerability management 
program for XSEDE resources based on QualysGuard. 
This control is complimented with an administrative control 
in the form of policies about how quickly different levels of 




E Y XSEDENet is a private network backbone just for 
communication between major XSEDE SPs. Regular 
traffic is not routed to transit over it. Some sites trust this 
more and apply looser rules for firewalls and monitoring. 
IDS E N Most level 1 SPs use Bro for an IDS, and there is strong 
Bro expertise and support in the community 
Virtualization E Y XSEDE utilizes virtualization for many centralized support 
services, many of which are hosted at IU. While not done 
directly for security, this allows strong isolation of services, 
quicker recover, and the ability to replicate them more 
quickly if there is a DoS or other attack. 
Spam Filters E Y XSEDE has several mail lists all of which have some 





08: Control Recommendations 
XSEDE should begin with implementing the controls labeled high priority that address the three risks 
ranked 50. Next they should move onto the medium priority risks. Prioritization within that class should be 
based on how many significant risks a control addresses, how effective the control is expected to be, and 
how much the control costs in terms of time, resource or political will. 
High Priority (Risk(s) Addressed >= 50) 
1. RECOMMENDED Change password reset procedures to choose random passwords for users. 
○ Mitigates risk #27 and #36 
2. RECOMMENDED Develop and rollout mandatory security training for XSEDE staff. The goal is to 
familiarize them with important policy and procedure and make them resistant to social 
engineering. 
○ Addresses risk #38 and mitigates #13, #21, and #31. 
3. Require two-factor for all XSEDE users 
○ Addresses #27 and #36 
4. Provide simple, light-weight user profiling tools for SPs to detect compromised accounts before 
they are used in conjunction with a zero-day exploit. 
○ Mitigates risk #27, #36, #4, #7, #10 
Medium Priority (Risk(s) Addressed 25-49) 
1. RECOMMENDED Maintain strong leadership and regular meetings for XSEDE security ops. 
Participation of level 1 SPs should not be optional. Security personnel and resource allocations 
should also be evaluated and redistributed at least annually to be proportional to where the work 
is done or needed to be done. 
○ Mitigates risk #27, #28, #32 and #34 
2. RECOMMENDED Perform audits to make sure XSEDE systems and services stay true to 
baselines. Audits need not be invasive and may consist in part of questionnaires to be filled out 
by SPs or checklists for them to complete. 
○ Addresses risk #13 and Mitigates #11, #14, #22, #31, #33, and #37 
3. RECOMMENDED Have regular security incident drills and require participation from all level 1 
SPs. 
○ Mitigates risk #32 and possibly #38 
4. RECOMMENDED Develop per service security baselines for critical XSEDE support services. 
○ Mitigates risk #13 and #33 
5. RECOMMENDED Identify unsupported software in the XSEDE software stack and either (a) 
retire and eradicate it, (b) update or replace it, or (c) commit resources to adopt and maintain it. 
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○ Addresses risk #25 
6. RECOMMENDED Identify services not replicated across at least two XSEDE SPs and either 
replicate them or move to a service provider with DoS protections. Focus on critical services first. 
○ Mitigates risk #17 
7. RECOMMENDED Identify and minimize services running as root on XSEDE systems; reconfigure 
to run as non-root wherever possible and recommend jails or other containment mechanisms 
where this is not possible. 
○ Mitigates risk #28 and potentially #39 
8. RECOMMENDED Inventory how system accounts are used for various services and identify 
those using unencrypted certificates or SSH keys. Protect the credential as best as possible, limit 
the capabilities of the credential and corresponding account to only those needed, and monitor for 
any unexpected use of such accounts. 
○ Mitigates risk #9 and maybe #39 
9. RECOMMENDED Either internally or using an external service, perform code audits of commonly 
deployed XSEDE software. This could mean requiring them to use SWAMP or coverity as part of 
the SD&I review. 
○ Addresses risk #23 and mitigates risk #30. 
10. RECOMMENDED Deploy DNSSEC across the xsede.org domain. 
○ Addresses risk #12. 
11. Utilize a redundant, offsite backup service for critical XSEDE services. This is not for user data, 
but system resiliency. 
○ Addresses risk #14. 
12. Deploy a central syslog server and host-based IDS for XSEDE as well as correlate network IDS 
data from sensors on XSEDENet. 
○ Addresses risk #15 and #11 
13. Identify grand-fathered in services and run through SD&I review process. 
○ Addresses risk #24 and #30 
Low Priority (Risk(s) Addressed < 25) 
● RECOMMENDED Migrate from majordomo to an email list service that requires login over 
HTTPS for list and subscription management, rather than plaintext emails with plaintext 
passwords for management. 
○ Addresses risk #5 
● RECOMMENDED Create a standard for authentication to receive an XSEDE acceptable 
certificate and audit for compliance. 
○ Mitigates risk #2 
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● RECOMMENDED Identify and remove local or non-XSEDE authentication systems for XSEDE 
services and replace with XSEDE Kerberos or GSI where possible. 
○ Addresses risk #3 
● RECOMMENDED Require a second email address to be registered for account creation. 
○ Mitigates risk #7 
● Rework the processes of account creation for XSEDE to reach a higher level of assurance, likely 
relying on email and the PI less for identity vetting. 
○ Mitigates risk #4 
● Require authentication for Lync meetings. 
○ Addresses risk #6 
● Utilize security questions for self-service resets falling back to manual processes if that fails. 
○ Addresses risk #7 
● Shorten ticket or certificate lifetime 
○ Mitigates risk #8. 
● Disable publickey SSH access on XSEDE resources and manage certificates for users securely 
on their behalf. 
○ Addresses risk #10 
● Use network filesystems that encrypt in transit for user filesystems. 
○ Mitigates risk #19 
● Use encrypted filesystems with strong guarantees of isolation between users. 
○ Addresses risk #19. 
● Do not put ticket contents in the emails but only a URL where one must authenticate to add to the 
ticket or view it. 
○ Addresses risk #20 
● Require full disk encryption for incident response team members workstations and laptops. 





Appendix A. XSEDE Systems & Services 
This appendix contains details about the various services shown in the Systems & Services table of 
section 04. XSEDE System Characterization. This list was accurate for the 2012 XSEDE Risk 
Assessment. 
A.1 Level 1 SP Compute and Storage Resources 
The most visible and arguably most critical XSEDE resources are the major compute and storage 
resources provided by the level 1 service providers (SPs). These are all tightly integrated with common 
authentication systems and the high-speed XSEDEnet backplane. While XSEDE would not fail with any 
one of these resources absent, there would be little to XSEDE if they were all unavailable to our user 
community. 
COMPUTE RESOURCE NAME HOST SP 
Blacklight PSC 
Gordon CC SDSC 










OSG Condor Pool USC 
 





Data Oasis SDSC 
XWFS TACC/NICS/NCSA 
 
The most current list is at https://www.xsede.org/resources/overview . 
Data 
There should be no PII (Personally Identifiable Information) or other legally protected data associated with 
XSEDE allocations on these systems. Nor should there be proprietary company data under NDA or other 
restrictions as the XSEDE allocations are for open scientific research funded by the NSF. However, this 
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does not mean that individual SPs do not share their resources with private sector partners who may 
have proprietary data on the systems. However, that is not an XSEDE issue, and it would be between the 
individual SP and their customers how they protect such sensitive data. 
This said, the data is still not public, and XSEDE provides confidentiality to users through use of file-
system permissions and ACLs. Furthermore, a given compute node is usually only running one user's job 
at a particular moment, and other users cannot typically login to another's active compute nodes. While 
XSEDE SPs strive to deliver reliable storage providing for integrity and availability of user data, the 
ultimate onus is on individual users to make sure they backup their data. 
In addition to user data for compute jobs, there are credentials stored on these systems. Kerberos tickets 
or GSI certificates allow for single-sign-on, but this means that private keys are sometimes stored on disk. 
In such cases they are protected by restricted file system permissions. Users may also create SSH 
private keys and put them on systems manually, but it is up to them to protect these keys they generate 
themselves. Some SPs don't allow public key authentication, and others check that users encrypt the 
keys with passphrases. 
Data Flow 
Primarily, user data is moved manually gridftp or sftp protocols (often through a front-end like 
GlobusOnline). These services typically use either GSI certificates or Kerberos for authentication, but 
some allow public key authentication with SFTP. 
Most SPs mount distributed filesystems that abstract data movement over the network from users. For 
example, the XSEDE-wide file system is mounted on most of these compute resources. 
Credentials typically don't flow from system to system, but instead credentials on a client system are used 
to get new proxy credentials on the remote system. Gridmap files and other information related to 
authorization and accounting are pushed from the XSEDE central database are discussed elsewhere. 
System Interfaces 
Gridftp, SFTP and XWFS are discussed in the section above on data flow. In addition to these interfaces 
for data flow, there are interfaces for shell login (i.e., ssh, gsi-ssh), job submission (e.g., GRAM and 
Unicore), accounting (e.g., AMIE which is discussed later), and more. These and others are discussed 
more thoroughly in the section on the XSEDE software stack. 
In addition to the core services listed above, there is nothing preventing individual SPs from running 
various other services, but these are not XSEDE interfaces and are more appropriately documented in 
risk assessments at individual SPs. 
A.2 AMIE 
More information is available on AMIE at http://software.xsede.org/production/xdcdb/amie-docs.tar. 
Documents found there include AMIE Model, AMIE Installation and Configuration and Implementing AMIE 
documents. The AMIE code itself is at http://software.xsede.org/production/xdcdb/amie.tar. 
The AMIE model consists of two sites and an agreed upon set of transactions that the two sites will use to 
send account management data to each other. A transaction consists of packets of data sent between the 
two sites. The site sending a packet is called the local site and the packet is known to the sending site as 
an outgoing packet. The receiving site is called the remote site and the packet received is known to the 
receiving site as an incoming packet. The site that creates the transaction (and sends the first packet) is 
also called the originating site. 
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AMIE is transaction based. Transactions have a number of properties. These are the local site, the 
remote site, the originating site, a transaction id, and a state. Once created, the first four properties do not 
change. However, the state changes over time. 
The transaction id is used to distinguish one transaction from another. The originating site chooses the 
transaction id without consulting the remote site. The only rule is that a transaction id created by one site 
may not be reused by that site for a different transaction. Hence a transaction is identified by the 
originating site, the transaction id, the local site, and the remote site. 
AMIE defines 3 states for a transaction: in-progress, completed, or failed. The initial state of a transaction 
is in-progress. It remains in that state until all packets have been processed. If all packets have been 
successfully processed, the transaction state becomes completed. If any of the packets causes a failure, 
the transaction state becomes failed. 
Transactions also have packets which contain account management data. Incoming packets are those 
packets received from the remote site. Outgoing packets are those packets created by the local site to be 
sent to the remote site. Outgoing packets are created either when the transaction is created or as a reply 
to an incoming packet. 
AMIE does not specify a pre-defined set of transactions. It specifies a set of packets which can be used 
within transactions, but the sites must agree on the packets that are used within transactions as well as 
the ordering of those packets. 
A packet has a number of properties. These are type, version, packet id, and state. It also has a list of 
expected replies. 
The types and their contents are determined by the AMIE XML schema. As of the writing of this 
document, the AMIE XML schema only specifies version "1.0". However, in anticipation of newer 
versions, each packet must also specify its AMIE version, since the content of the packet depends on the 
version. 
Each packet has a packet id which is chosen by the site that creates the packet. It has to be unique within 
the set of outgoing packets for a given transaction. 
Data 
AMIE accounting transaction data relies on information in the XDCDB and information sent back and forth 
to XSEDE service providers. Integrity is much more important than confidentiality of this accounting data. 
Still, much of it is not public information 
Data Flow 
AMIE has a centralized service that all Service Providers communicate with, and AMIE has services run 
at each SP. Data flows back and forth between the XDCDB and databases at the local sites through 
AMIE transactions. 
System Interfaces 
AMIE is a transaction based system with interfaces (tunneled over SSH) at each Service Provider and an 
XSEDE AMIE interface in front of the XDCDB. 
A.3 CILogon 
The CILogon Service provides secure access to XSEDE services using InCommon campus logins. It 
obtains short-lived credentials from a private CILogon MyProxy server for user sessions. The CILogon 
Service provides an alternate mechanism of authenticating to Globus and XSEDE services and does not 
replace existing authentication mechanisms.  
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See http://www.cilogon.org/xsede and http://www.cilogon.org/portal-delegation for details. 
Data 
The CILogon service maintains a database of user authentications to track name/email changes which 
would affect the certificate subject Distinguished Name (DN). No passwords are stored by the CILogon 
Service. 
Data Flow 
XSEDE services request user data from the CILogon Service using the OAuth protocol. Users 
authenticate with their campus identity providers, which release SAML attributes to the CILogon Service. 
The CILogon Service then issues short-lived credentials to XSEDE services for use on behalf of the 
users. 
System Interfaces 
User and service access is via HTTPS (port 443). SSH access for system administration is restricted to 
bastion hosts secured with two-factor authentication. 
A.4 CI Tutor 
www.citutor.org at NCSA. Contact: Sandie Kappes <kappes@illinois.edu>. CI-Tutor provides the means 
to learn about High Performance Computing and CyberInfrastructure (CI). 
Data 
CI-Tutor can be accessed by anyone, and thus there is no sensitive information. That said, users still 
need to create an account with a username and password. Passwords are stored in an encrypted form in 
a MySQL database. 
Data Flow 
CI-Tutor is not currently hosted on an NCSA or XSEDE server, but is hosted by SiteGround which is a 
cloud based hosting service. It is a completely isolated platform with its own authentication system, and 
no data flows between it and other XSEDE resources. 
System Interfaces 
HTTPS is the only interface provided to XSEDE, though SiteGround could of course have its own special 
administrative interfaces abstracted away from us by the cloud service. 
A.5 Virtual Workshop 
https://www.cac.cornell.edu at Cornell. (Linked to from XUP) Contact: Resa Alvord <rda1@cornell.edu> . 
Data 
Nothing sensitive to XSEDE is stored here. It is all educational materials, available to anyone who 
registers an account. This is done automatically for XSEDE users who follow from the link on the XSEDE 
portal. 
Data Flow 
It is it's own isolated system, but XSEDE users are pre-registered if they come from the portal. This is 




XSEDE users only interact with the service over HTTPS. Cornell has it's own administrative interfaces 
most likely, but being an isolated resource provided by a third party, there is little concern about XSEDE 
being affected as no XSEDE credentials are stored on this service. 
A.6 XSEDE.org DNS 
HOSTNAME LOCATION ADMIN COMMENTS 
ns1.xsede.org NCSA netneng@ncsa.illinois.edu  
dns1.tacc.utexas.edu TACC   
dns2.tacc.utexas.edu TACC   
dns3.tacc.utexas.edu TACC   
 
XsedeNet has multiple DNS servers currently in production. The primary DNS (ns1.xsede.org, 
141.142.143.137) server is located at NCSA. In addition, there are three DNS servers that serve as 
secondary DNS located at TACC. Also, there are several secondary DNS delegations throughout the 
XSEDE network. 
XSEDE Secondary DNS Delegations 
ZONE NAME SERVER CONTACT DELEGATED 
NICS ns0.nics.utk.edu, ns1.nics.utk.edu Stephen McNally ,<smcnally@utk.edu> yes 
IU dns1.iu.edu, dns2.iu.edu dns-admin@indiana.edu yes 
SDSC ns0.sdsc.edu, ns1.sdsc.edu noc@sdsc.edu, hutton@ucsd.edu, jeff@sdsc.edu yes 
NCSA dns1.ncsa.illinois.edu, dns2.ncsa.illinois.edu neteng@ncsa.illinois.edu yes 
PSC dns1.psc.edu, charon.psc.edu pscnet-admin@psc.edu yes 
TACC (dns1,dns2,dns3).tacc.utexas.edu jones@tacc.utexas.edu yes 
 
Data 
All data is public and consists of just CNAME and A records. 
Data Flow 
Data is replicated over DNS protocol tcp/53. 
System Interfaces 




A.7 Conference Call System 
XSEDE utilizes the University of Illinois's Unified Communications Lync service for video and audio 
conferencing. 
Data 
Discussions can be very sensitive, but they are not archived. 
Data Flow 
The URLs can be sensitive since often they are all that is needed to join a call. People generally email 
these and/or put them in meeting invitations. 
Credentials are not needed, though UIUC people tend to login with their UIUC netid. Few if any calls use 
PINs or extra protections, but those that do have different mechanisms of dissemination 
System Interfaces 
The conference call system works over traditional phone lines, a web client or Lync. 
A.8 Mail Lists 
HOSTNAME LOCATION ADMIN COMMENTS 
relay-*.ncsa.uiuc.edu NCSA Chris Lindsey cpl@illinois.edu  
pop.ncsa.uiuc.edu NCSA cpl@illinois.edu  
zimbra.xsede.org NCSA cpl@illinois.edu  
mhonarc.xsede.org NCSA cpl@illinois.edu  
 
The mail lists (both private and public) for XSEDE are run by the NCSA majordomo mail list server relays. 
A hot backup sits on the VM farm at IU, and a Zimbra server is used to allow applications to retrieve mail, 
share files securely, and provide IMAPS/POPS access for applications. 
Data 
Besides membership data in majordomo config files, the archived lists create data. All email lists are 
archived, and no distinction is made based on sensitivity. 
Some files are shared through the Zimbra briefcase feature, though nothing containing PII or specially 
regulated data. 
Data Flow 
Most data flows as email through over SMTP. Searchable archives are accessed over HTTPS. Email 
read by applications is done over SSL, and the Zimbra syncs files over SSL. 
Email lists are managed by plaintext passwords sent in email. So these credentials are sent around 




Most management and use of the lists is by email over SMTP. Archives can be accessed over HTTPS. 
System admins configure majordomo through the command line over SSH. Applications access Zimbra 
through POPS or IMAPS. 
A.9 Genesis II 
HOSTNAME LOCATION ADMIN COMMENTS 
gffs-{1,2}.xsede.org IU Mike Lowe (jomlowe@iu.edu)  
sts-{1,2}.xsede.org IU Mike Lowe (jomlowe@iu.edu)  
 
The Genesis II rootname service (RNS) and secure token service (STS) are deployed in support of GFFS 
on XSEDE resources. The STS plays an analogous role to MyProxy and Oauth with the Globus Toolkit 
managing credentials and security tokens. The RNS service provides directory services, which could be 
used for GFFS (e.g., similar to AFS's global name space). 
Data 
• The GFFS protects data against unauthorized access using a system of ACLs (Access Control 
List) that control accessibility of every resource in RNS space. 
• Data in transit is encrypted by the TLS protocol. 
• Server-side data is protected by existing Operating System mechanisms, in that the container 
database is in a user's private folder. Passwords are not stored in clear text in the database. 
• No guarantees can be made about data privacy once it reaches job processing (EMS), since 
those systems are outside of GFFS control. 
 
Data Flow 
• Users are authenticated against STS (Secure Token Servers) established in the grid. 
• Client to server communication is encrypted with TLS. 
• Users can authenticate against XSEDE MyProxy server to obtain their session identity for TLS. 
This login is also vetted against the XSEDE Kerberos server via a Kerberos STS in the grid. 
• Trust delegation in GFFS relies on SAML trust delegations embedded in the SOAP headers, as 
defined in SDIACT-110 (https://jira.xsede.org/browse/SDIACT-110) 
• User credentials are stored in local user state directory (by default in “$HOME/.genesisII-2.0”). 
• Server-side records for STS identities (and all other state items for the GFFS) are held in the 
container's private state database. 
• GFFS supports authentication via MyProxy, InCommon ECP, Username/Password, Kerberos, 
and X509 Keystore. 
 
System Interfaces 
• The GFFS provides a web services interface over TLS protocol, by default on port 18443. 
• The GFFS Container is the software component that provides web services. It runs as a non-
privileged user. 
• To use the resources (GFFS and EMS), user has to have xsede account that can be 




A.10 Globus Listener 
http://globus-usage.xsede.org at ANL. Contact: Stu Martin <smartin@mcs.anl.gov>. The Globus listener 
collects metrics on GTK services from the different SPs. 
Data 
Nothing is very sensitive. It just collects statistics on file sizes and endpoints used in different gridftp 
transfers. 
Data Flow 
GRAM/GridFTP servers send data to the globus listener service running at the IU VM farm. 
System Interfaces 
Globus listener uses a proprietary application layer protocol over UDP. 
A.11 Globus Online 
https://globusonline.org at ANL. Contact: Steve Tuecke <tuecke@ci.uchicago.edu>. Third party front-end 
for data movement through gridftp protocol between endpoints both within XSEDE and external to it. 
Data 
The service is used to transfer data between systems, most of which is neither public nor highly sensitive 
in XSEDE. It is primarily used for transferring large scientific data sets. Globus Online does hold short-
lived end-user certificates on behalf of the users to make transfers. These certificates are just for GridFTP 
and do not have the rights to login through GSISSH. 
Data Flow 
Bulk data transfers are between GO endpoints which are either gridftp servers registered with Globus 
Online or desktop clients running GlobusConnect software. 
GO manages the certificates and private keys for users necessary to make transfers. It receives the keys 
and certificates from the XSEDE MyProxy CA by passing an OAuth token. It gets the OAuth token by 
redirecting the users OAuth portlet on the XSEDE user portal 
System Interfaces 
GlobusOnline has a web interface used for most functions. There is also a CLI interface for scripting, and 
this requires SSH keys to registered on the GO website. Finally, the GlobusConnect client can be run on 
desktop systems to create another endpoint for transfer on your local machine. 
A.12 Metrics for IIS 
info-metrics.teragrid.org at IU. Contact: JP Navarro <navarro@mcs.anl.gov>. The IIS Metrics server 
collects all the logs for the info.teragrid.org and repo.teragrid.org/software.teragrid.org/software.xsede.org 
servers and processes those logs to produce metrics information. 
Data 




Log data from info.teragrid.org and software repositories 
(repo.teragrid.org/software.teragrid.org/software.xsede.org) flow to the IIS metrics server. This is done 
with scp and public key authentication. 
System Interfaces 
SSH is the only interface for all transactions. 
A.13 Integrated Information Systems 
HOSTNAME LOCATION ADMIN COMMENTS 
info.xsede.org NA JP Navarro <navarro@mcs.anl.gov> 
Rotating between info1 & 
info2 
info.dyn.xsede.org NA JP Navarro <navarro@mcs.anl.gov> 
Rotating between info1 & 
info2 
info.dyn.teragrid.org NA JP Navarro <navarro@mcs.anl.gov> 
Rotating between info1 & 
info2 
info1.dyn.teragrid.org IU JP Navarro <navarro@mcs.anl.gov> 
 
info2.dyn.teragrid.org Serveraxis.com JP Navarro <navarro@mcs.anl.gov> 
 
info1.dyn.xsede.org IU JP Navarro <navarro@mcs.anl.gov> 
 
info2.dyn.xsede.org NICS JP Navarro <navarro@mcs.anl.gov> 
 
 
XSEDE information services are an integrated collection of web services (in the broadest sense) that 
publish information about the capabilities (systems, software, and services) available to the XSEDE user 
community. XSEDE Information Services defines the standards and services that that enable XSEDE 
resource and service providers to publish and advertise their offerings, via software interfaces, to the user 
community. The XSEDE user portal, user documentation, science gateways, and user applications can 
query information services software interfaces to discover information about XSEDE. 
Data 
IIS aggregates and publishes these types of information: 
• Service provider scheduler jobs, percent loaded, and related batch system information 
• Resource characteristics 
• Resource capabilities, software, and service information 
• Resource outages 
• Resource GridFTP service speed information 
• Capability descriptions 
• Science gateway descriptions 
• Resources accessible to each allocated project mapping 
 
Most information is public, but some job information requires authenticated users. Nothing would be 




Information flows FROM these sources to IIS: 
• XSEDE central database, Speedpage database 
• Resource Description Repository service 
• Service provider information services 
• NCSA HPC Software Catalog 
 
Information flows FROM IIS to: 
• XSEDE user portal and documentation 
• Science Gateways 
• INCA monitoring system 
• Users via xdinfo command line tool 
• Custom user or service provider applications 
 
System Interfaces 
It is all web interfaces (HTTP/HTTPS) whether through the xdinfo client or a browser. Admins also access 
it through a web interface. 
A.14 INCA 
Inca.xsede.org at SDSC. Contact: <inca@sdsc.edu>. Inca is a user-level, centralized monitoring system 
that runs periodic tests to determine the state of XSEDE provided services and software, in particular, 
services that level 1 & 2 SPs have registered with XSEDE as being provided. Inca also monitors GRAM 
usage, CA and CRL validity, and resource registration in MDS. Communication between the central 
server and the XSEDE resources occur using standard GSI credentials and SSL. The results of the tests 
are stored on the virtual machine inca.xsede.org. No information stored is particularly sensitive. 
Data 




















Monitoring information is collected from a regular user account called 'inca'. Our Inca server runs on a 
OTP protected VM machine at SDSC called capac.sdsc.edu. It spawns client daemons via SSH on the 
login nodes using our 'inca' account, which connect back to the server via a SSL connection. The client 
daemon, called the reporter manager, runs a number of user-level tests on a regular schedule via a perl 
cron module. When a test completes, the results are securely transmitted back to the central server. 
When it executes a test that requires a x509 proxy, it contacts the Inca server via the SSL connection and 
requests MyProxy information which it uses to download a short-term proxy credential. When it finishes 
running the test, it deletes the user proxy (http://inca.sdsc.edu/releases/2.6/guide/userguide-
incat.html#PROXIES). 
System Interfaces 
GSISSH is used to run remote jobs and collect data. A web interface is used to view the data. The data 
generated by the Inca tests are world viewable at inca.xsede.org. 
A.15 Jira 
Jira.xsede.org at SDSC. Contact: Shava Smallen <ssmallen@sdsc.edu>. The XSEDE Jira system is 
used for task tracking for multiple XSEDE project areas, primarily SDI activities, though. It resides on the 
software.xsede.org host at the IU web farm. 
Data 
The ticket system data is stored in a database on the same system as the web server. There is little 
sensitive information in these tickets and little in regards to PII except the full name of users. 
Data Flow 
Tickets can be entered directly into the ticket system via the web interface, and comments can be added 
via email or the web interface. Actions on tickets may also generate emails back to the original reporter. 
System Interfaces 
All Jira interfaces are over HTTPS or email. The OS management interface is the same as that for 
software.xsede.org, described elsewhere. 
A.16 Karnak Predictor 
http://karnak.xsede.org at IU. Contact: Warren Smith <wsmith@tacc.utexas.edu>. Service provides 
predictions and information about jobs on batch scheduled computer systems. 
Data 
The backend database contains information about jobs and the current and historical ordering of jobs in 
batch queues. The job information includes usernames, but otherwise nothing particularly sensitive. 
Data Flow 
The service can be accessed directly by users as well as by other tools and services. The Karnak service 




The Karnak service is a REST service at http://karnak.xsede.org. It currently provides content in HTML, 
XML, and text. 
Users do not authenticate to the Karnak service and the services are not accessible over HTTPS. The 
service does not disclose user names or detailed job information so there is no need to secure client 
connections. Karnak receives information about jobs from the TeraGrid Integrated Information Services. It 
retrieves this by authenticating to (via host X.509 credentials) and then querying the WS-MDS service on 
info.teragrid.org. 
A.17 XSEDE Kerberos Realm 
The XSEDE Kerberos service provides username/password authentication for all XSEDE Portal users. It 
is a critical resource as the portal requires it as well as anyone who needs to use myproxy.teragrid.org. 
HOSTNAME LOCATION ADMIN COMMENTS 
kerberos.teragrid.org NCSA Chris Lindsey @ NCSA  
kerberos-1.teragrid.org NCSA   
kerberos-2.teragrid.org PSC Shane Filus @ PSC  
 
Data 
The Kerberos servers contain usernames and hashed passwords for all XSEDE users. 
Data Flow 
The Kerberos service is primarily used by the XSEDE User Portal, myproxy.teragrid.org, and 
myproxy.psc.teragrid.org. 
System Interfaces 
Kerberos protocol and SSH through two-factor bastion for OS administration. 
A.18 Certificate Authorities 
HOSTNAME LOCATION ADMIN COMMENTS 
myproxy.teragrid.org NCSA ca-admin@ncsa.illinois.edu  
myproxy.psc.teragrid.org PSC ca-admin@psc.edu  
 
XSEDE accepts user certificates from the CAs listed at https://www.xsede.org/security. New CAs must be 
accredited by the International Grid Trust Federation. The XSEDE MyProxy CAs issue short-lived user 
certificates. These user certificates allow XSEDE users to authenticate to XSEDE grid services (gsissh, 
gram, gridftp). Some other CAs certificates are valid for up to 13 months, though not those run by 
XSEDE. Host certificates are provided by the InCommon IGTF-accredited CA, run by Comodo. 
The myproxy.xsede.org server (primary, at NCSA) and myproxy.psc.xsede.org server (backup, at PSC) 
are used by the XSEDE User Portal and other XSEDE services to obtain short-lived certificates for 
XSEDE users who authenticate with their TERAGRID.ORG Kerberos username/password (i.e., their 
XSEDE Portal username/password). These servers use the NCSA MyProxy CA and PSC MyProxy CA on 
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the back-end. These CAs are critical to the full functionality of the user portal and GlobusOnline for data 
transfer. 
Data 
Each CA has a private key that it uses to sign certificates. The private key must be protected from 
disclosure. Compromise of the CA private key allows the attacker to create arbitrary certificates and 
thereby impersonate users and hosts. 
Each CA gathers information to identify users and hosts for issuing certificates. Personally identifying 
information must be protected from disclosure. 
Each user and host has a private key corresponding to their certificate that must be protected from 
disclosure. This is typically done with filesystem permissions. 
Data Flow 
Subscribers submit certificate requests to CAs which return signed certificates. These are public 
documents, protected from tampering by cryptographic signature. They do not require further protection. 
When authenticating to MyProxy CAs, users provide their password to the MyProxy server for verification. 
Passwords are not stored on the MyProxy server. Connections are protected with SSL. 
System Interfaces 
MyProxy CAs use the MyProxy Protocol. 
A.19 Nagios Service 
nagios.xsede.org at IU. Contact: Joe Rinkovsky <jrinkovs@iu.edu>. Nagios is a user-level, centralized 
monitoring system that runs periodic tests to determine the state of XSEDE provided service in particular, 
services that level 1 & 2 SPs have registered with XSEDE as being provided. This data is used to track 
uptime and by the XOC to contact service owners in order to resolve outages. 
Data 
There is no sensitive data on these system, just statistics like uptimes. 
There are some stored credentials on the Nagios service for unprivileged accounts. 
Data Flow 
Authentication to the Nagios server is via Kerberos. 
All web traffic is over HTTPS. Some services have credentials saved in their configuration files but these 
credentials are only sent over the network via encrypted channels. 
System Interfaces 
Administrators login through the web interface over HTTPS. 
System configuration is managed via SSH. Logins are via two-factor authentication. 





oa4mp.xsede.org at IU. Contact: Ed Berger <eberger@psc.edu>. The XSEDE OAuth Service 
authenticates XSEDE users and issues short-lived certificates to XSEDE science gateways (web portals), 
such as Globus Online. For more details see https://portal.xsede.org/oauth/. 
Data 
The XSEDE OAuth Service maintains a database of registered gateways/portals and their associated 
public keys. No passwords are stored. 
Data Flow 
Users enter their XSEDE username/password on a web form when authenticating to this service. 
System Interfaces 
All interactions are over HTTPS (port 443) except for the MyProxy communications over TLS. 
A.21 Secure Jabber Server 
At NCSA. Contact: Warren Raquel <wraquel@ncsa.illinois.edu>. This is an encrypted chat service used 
by the XSEDE Incident Response Team. 
Data 
Discussions of XSEDE security incidents are facilitated through this server, but it does not archive 
conversations. 
Data Flow 
Chat messages flow between chat clients on the IRT member systems and the chat server. 
System Interfaces 
Jabber (XMPP) protocol over TLS. TLS is forced. 
A.22 perfSONAR 
HOSTNAME LOCATION ADMIN COMMENTS 
ps.<sitename>.xsede.org Each level 1 SP Kathy Benninger <benninger@psc.edu>  
psarch.psc.xsede.org PSC   
 
perfSONAR provides an active, distributed network test infrastructure for XSEDE with one pS 
Measurement Point (MP) deployed at each level 1 SP and one central Measurement Archive (MA) 
display server deployed at PSC. The pS MPs run a mesh of scheduled BWCTL iperf, OWAMP, and 
traceroute tests between SP sites with results collected by an esmond monitoring daemon and offered via 
web interface. The MPs are available to members of the XSEDE ops-network group as network test 
points for on-demand testing (e.g. iperf, owping, tcpdump) when more in-depth analysis is required. Each 
MP also offers, reverse ping, reverse traceroute, NPAD and NDT services via a web interface along with 




The automatic data collected are network statistics from OWAMP, traceroutes, and IP performance 
testing tools (iperf3). None of these archives are sensitive. 
On-demand reverse pings and reverse traceroutes can be performed at any MP. Also, tcpdump traces 
can be collected at any one point (by authorized users) which may be more sensitive. The output of these 
on-demand services is not regularly archived to the MA. 
Data Flow 
Measurement data flows from each of the MPs to the MA. This data is not sensitive and is not encrypted 
in transit. 
System Interfaces 
Management of the system can be done over HTTPS or on the command line through SSH. Reverse 
ping, reverse traceroutes, NDT, and NPAD are available over HTTP to anyone. 
The MA will run a collection service to store data from all sites in a sql database. 
A.23 Resource Description Repository 
rdr.xsede.org at PSC. Contact: Ed Hanna <ehanna@psc.edu>. Resource Description Repository is a 
common, central repository where Service Providers (SP) will publish new, and manage existing, 
resource descriptions. RDR provides the interface for SPs, and other entities, to publish and manage 
resource descriptions. 
Data 
The RDR data is stored in the the teragrid database in the rdr schema in the production server as the 
XSEDE Central Database (XDCDB) at SDSC. It contains compute, grid, storage and data collection 
resources along with conversion factors. A complete history of all resources is also maintained. 
Data is not sensitive, but integrity is important as it contains charge rates and conversion factors. 
Data Flow 
SPs update the web interface at rdr.xsede.org with new and existing resource information. rdr.xsede.org 
provides an xml interface to the data that allows the data for an SP's resources to be downloaded by IIS 
kits at each SP. From the local IIS client the data is published into IIS and the portal retrieves any needed 
data through IIS interfaces. 
System Interfaces 
The end result of the RDR data path is available from https://www.xsede.org/resources/overview. On the 
backend data is either moved over web services (HTTPS) or a JDBC over SSL connection to the 
postgresql server at SDSC. 
A.24 RSA SecurID 
rizzo.ncsa.utk at NICS. Contact: Gary Rogers <grogers3@utk.edu>. The XSEDE RSA SecurID service is 
to allow admins to use an XSEDE domain RSA server for administering central services. Some use local 




The RSA servers contain usernames and hashed passwords for all XSEDE users. It also contains 
cryptographic seeds for the tokens. 
Data Flow 
RSA servers are either directly contacted by services for authentication or through RADIUS servers. 
System Interfaces 
Administration is done through a web browser over HTTPS. RSA ships a virtual appliance that is mostly a 
black box. Other interaction happen over proprietary protocols or RADIUS. 
A.25 Ticket System 
tickets.xsede.org at TACC. Contact: Mike Packard <mpackard@tacc.utexas.edu>. The XSEDE Ticket 
System provides XSEDE an interface to report problems and a standard, XSEDE-wide method of tracking 
and resolving those problems. The ticket contains the complete record of responses, replies, and 
notations generated by the resolution of the problem. XSEDE uses RT (Request Tracker) for its ticket 
system interface. There is a failover backup system at NICS that can be switched to primary within a few 
moments, and without any data loss. 
Data 
The ticket system data is stored in a PostgreSQL relational database system at TACC This data includes 
all of the email and log entry text fields along with the metadata for each ticket. Sometimes this may 
include sensitive information such as reports of security incidents. However, there is little in regards to PII 
except the full name of users. 
Data Flow 
Email sent to specific XTS addresses are routed directly to the ticket system, which automatically creates 
a ticket. User responses are automatically added it to an existing ticket. 
Newly created tickets are assigned to the XSEDE Operations Center. From there the ticket is evaluated 
and then assigned to a group/individual with whom the problem will be resolved. Actions on tickets may 
also generate emails back to the original reporter. 
The other data flow is between the web front end and the backend database system of which this is one 
database. 
System Interfaces 
The ticket system is accessible directly via https://tickets.xsede.org/ or through the User Portal at 
https://portal.xsede.org/group/xup/tickets. The other front-end interface is through receipt of email to 
help@xsede.org, which generates a new ticket. 
A.26 Sciforma 
projects.xsede.org at IU. Contact: Scott Simmerman <simmerma@eecs.utk.edu>. Sciforma is the project 
scheduling tool that is used to create the schedules for quarterly and annual reports as well as the 
planning schedule. In addition the ECSS areas use is to manage the ECSS resources and projects. 
Sciforma is available to all areas of XSEDE that need a project scheduling capability. Some areas also 




The data contained in Sciforma is basic XSEDE staff information much of which is also available on the 
XSEDE wiki or on their institution's staff directory. Their is nothing confidential about the project 
information and many times we end up providing images of the project schedules on the wiki or emailing 
them to the XSEDE staff.  
Data Flow 
The only automatic data flow out of Sciforma is to populate the wiki pages for some WBS area's staff 
directories. All of the information input into Sciforma is all manually entered. The current version of 
Sciforma uses JAVA and a PostgreSQL DB. Sciforma has a XSEDE built authentication component that 
allows it to be secured using the XUP Kerberos ID/PW. 
System Interfaces 
Sciforma has a client interface which has the most capabilities and is what everyone is told about and is 
directed to use. Sciforma also has a web interface version that has more limited capabilities and we do 
not generally recommend that it is used. For manual backups and restores of the DB Sciforma provides 
an admin web page. Sciforma is backed up automatically on a dailty basis. 
A.27 Security Wiki 
https://ops-security.xsede.org/ at NCSA. Contact: Warren Raquel <wraquel@illinois.edu>. This is a 
collaborative workspace for incident response. 
Data 
The data is very sensitive having to do with current and past security events for XSEDE. Access is limited 
to XSEDE security and incident response team members. 
Data Flow 
Data does not flow except through the file attachment interface of the wiki. 
System Interfaces 
Media wiki server running on HTTPS. 
A.28 SharePoint 
NAME WHERE EMAIL SHAREPOINT RESPONSIBILITIES 
Michael Gates SDSC mgates@sdsc.edu Administrator 
Michael Northrop UC mikenorthrop@uchicago.edu Security Administrator 
 
A Microsoft wiki used for quarterly and annual reporting, planning for future years, and for some special 
XSEDE groups to collaborate on documents. 
Data 
This website is reserved for groups of users collaborating on XSEDE reporting. It's private because only 
certain people are supposed to edit it, everything entered eventually becomes a part of public reports. So 




It is a self-contained system at SDSC. However, XSEDE is not the only project with a virtual space within 
this share point system. Data does not flow between spaces though. While it is possible to create 
connections to the Sharepoint data without using the web interface, these methods must be setup and 
configured properly to work. There are currently no such alternate access methods existing to our 
Sharepoint environment. Sharepoint uses an MSSQL database for its backend, it is possible to access 
the database via SQL tools in the way that you would any database. However, our SQL server is limited 
to specific services each with their own service account and access only to their own databases and the 
IT systems administrators at the site. 
System Interfaces 
All interaction is over HTTPS, authentication backed by active directory. Service account connections 
access only their databases with unique creditials. 
A.29 Single SignOn Hub 
login.xsede.org at IU. Contact: David Carver <dcarver@tacc.utexas.edu>. The XSEDE SSO (Single Sign-
on) Hub SSH service logs XSEDE users in after verifying their XSEDE kerberos/portal 
username/password with the XSEDE MyProxy service. On successful authentication, the MyProxy 
service issues short-lived certificates which are made available to the user in /tmp on the hub. Once 
logged into the hub, a user will be able to gsissh into applicable XSEDE GSISSH service nodes using the 
short-lived certificate with GSI authentication. For more details 
see https://portal.xsede.org/web/xup/single-sign-on-hub. 
Data 
The XSEDE SSO Hub service doesn't maintain any passwords for portal group users. It does receive (at 
login time) and store in /tmp, short-lived certificates for users that have logged in. The short-lived 
certificates are protected read-only for the specific users they belong to. 
Data Flow 
Users enter their XSEDE username/password when authenticating to this service. The service in turn 
communicates the users' XSEDE username/password to the XSEDE MyProxy service. On successful 
authentication, the XSEDE MyProxy service issues short-lived certificates for the users' use on the hub. 
System Interfaces 
All interactions are over SSH (port 22) except for the MyProxy communications over TLS and gsissh 
communications over custom ports used by certain XSEDE GSISSH services. 
A.30 Software Distribution & Source Repository 
https://software.xsede.org/ at ANL. Contact: Lukasz Lacinski <lukasz@ci.uchicago.edu>. The SVN-based 
source repository and software packages for production, campus bridging, gateways, security, and 
development are hosted on this web server run at the IU web farm. Use cases used by the architecture 
team and a deprecated XSEDE Bugzilla service are also hosted on this web server. While it has the look 
and feel of the XUP and website on the main page, it is a separate server managed by separate teams. 
Data 
Data includes software for SPs, the certificate trust store and many documents under revision control. 




Users can checkout software to their client systems with SVN or just browse through the web interface. 
Only a few dozen people are able to write to these repositories. Authentication is via XSEDE Kerberos. 
System Interfaces 
SVN over SSH or HTTP/S. 
A.31 Speedpage 
speedpage.psc.edu at IU. Contact: Bob Budden <rbudden@psc.edu>. Speedpage is an analysis tool 
used to test the performance of data movement to/from XSEDE resources. It uses the GridFTP protocol 
to initiate and monitor 3rd party copies between sites. Data is kept in a MySQL server and published via 
an Apache web interface. 
Data 
All of the data obtained by the Speedpage is world viewable via the web site or MySQL read only access. 
The system itself is protected by UNIX file permissions. However, a Kerberos keytab is kept for 
automation of the service. Short term, 24 hr, MyProxy certificates for and are obtained via the keytab to 
use for grid authentication. 
Data Flow 
Data is collected by issuing 3rd party globus-url-copy commands and parsing the output. Data is then 
stored in a MySQL database and published via Apache web server. 
System Interfaces 
SSH Limited number of PSC only staff access 
MySQL Read only account for XSEDE use 
Apache Web interface, world viewable 
 
A.32 User Profile Service 
https://info.xsede.org:8444/web-apps/html/profile-v1/usage at IU. Contact: Rion Dooley 
<dooley@tacc.utexas.edu>. The User Profile Service is an authenticated set of endpoints that provide 
user-specific views of XSEDE systems and services. While the root domain is collocated with the IIS 
services, it runs as a separate service in its own Tomcat container on each of the IIS services. The User 
Profile Service relies heavily on the XSEDE central database, a CouchDB instance, GPIR, and direct 
interaction with remote systems for its information. While every effort has been made to make the service 
interactions similar to the IIS services, the User Profile Service is a separate project developed and 
maintained outside of IIS. 
Data 
Data is primarily gathered at invocation time from the XSEDE central database and CouchDB. Some data 
is cached on disk. This data is protected by standard UNIX permissions. None of the data collected is 




Consumers pass their XSEDE username/password to the service using HTTPS Basic authentication on 
each invocation. The resulting data is passed via HTTPS back to the consumer in one of several user-
specified formats. 
System Interfaces 
All forward facing interfaces are accessed over HTTPS (port 4443). Access to the XSEDE central 
database is done via SSL. Communication with the remote MyProxy service is over TLS. Communication 
with the CouchDB instance is via HTTPS. 
A.33 Central Database 
HOSTNAME LOCATION ADMIN COMMENTS 
balthazar.sdsc.edu SDSC lcarson@sdsc.edu  
franco.psc.edu PSC Rob Light <light@psc.edu>  
 
tgcdb.xsede.org points to one of the above two hosts. 
The primary instance of the XDCDB runs at SDSC and the failover instance runs at PSC. At SDSC, the 
following servers are run: (what is run at psc) 
DESCRIPTION HOST PORT DATABASE 
production tgcdb.xsede.org 5432 teragrid 
testing tgcdb.xsede.org 3333 teragrid 
development tgcdb.xsede.org 3333 tgcdb_test 
 
The XDCDB is a PostgreSQL relational database that contains information regarding all XSEDE projects, 
allocations, users, resources and usage. 
The XDCDB consists of a number of schemas. The primary schema is the "acct" schema, which contains 
all of the project-related data. Other important schemas include the "portal" schema, used by the XSEDE 
User Portal (XUP) and the "amie" schema, used by the Account Management Information Exchange 
(AMIE) data transport system. 
Data 
A complete list of XDCDB schemas is below: 
SCHEMA DESCRIPTION LOCATION 
acct User Account Database  
amie Account Management Information Exchange http://svc.bu.edu/AMIE 
gateway XSEDE Science Gateway https://www.xsede.org/web/guest/gateways-listing 
gxmap Globus https://www.xsede.org/globus-online 
info_services   
mcp Master Control Program https://www.xsede.org/metascheduling 
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myproxy GSI=SSH tools https://www.xsede.org/oauth 
xras XSEDE Resource Allocation System Review Application 
https://xras-review.xsede.org and https://xras-
admin.xsede.org 
portal XSEDE User Portal https://portal.xsede.org 
pra Person Reconciliation Application internal 
rdr Resource Description Repository https://portal.xsede.org/web/guest/resources/overview 
user_services XSEDE User Services https://www.xsede.org/user-services 
PII Notes: The XDCDB stores the full name of users as given to us. 
Data Flow 
The primary means of data flow both into and out of the XDCDB is via AMIE. Data for projects, 
allocations, and PI/co-PI accounts originates in the XSEDE Resource Allocation System (XRAS), and is 
transported via AMIE to the XDCDB. Other account requests originate in the XUP, inserted directly into 
the XDCDB. The XDCDB in turn sends the data via AMIE to the relevant SPs. SPs send usage back to 
the XDCDB also via AMIE. 
System Interfaces 
The system interfaces to the XDCDB are XRAS, AMIE, the XUP and the xdusage command. 
A.34 XRAS Service 
HOSTNAME LOCATION ADMIN COMMENTS 
xras-review.xsede.org NCSA aschuele@illinois.edu  
xras-admin.xsede.org NCSA aschuele@illinois.edu  
 
XRAS (XSEDE Resource Allocation System) provides an interface for request review and administration 
for XSEDE resources. The system consists of two Web interfaces for review and administration. The 
backend of these Web interfaces is the XSEDE Central Database (XDCDB). There are also several 
supporting services: an identity service, an accounting service, and a rules engine as well as a RESTful 
API to communicate with the submission interface located in the XSEDE User Portal (XUP). 
Data 
XRAS data is stored in the XDCDB. This data includes all of the information contained in the individual 
request submitted to XRAS, along with the data associated with resources, opportunities, reviews and 
reviewers. 
PII Notes: XRAS stores the full name of users as given to us. 
Data Flow 
The request submission data is entered into the XUP. Data is stored in the XDCDB via the XRAS API. 
Administrators have access to all data in the request process through an administration interface. This 
interface allows administrators to modify requests, assign reviewers, award requests, and initiate the data 
flow process to the XSEDE central database (XDCDB). This transfer of data is via the AMIE. 
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Administrators also prepare reports for the periodic allocations review board meetings via the 
administration interface. 
Reviewers periodically access XRAS via the reviewer interface. Reviewers are allowed to view the current 
and past requests and reviews to which they are assigned along with past usage of associated requests. 
They then submit a review in text format of the request along with a numeric suggestion. 
System Interfaces 
XRAS is accessible through the XSEDE User Portal for Proposal Submission 
https://portal.xsede.org/submit-request . 
Reviewers access XRAS via https://xras-review.xsede.org/ Administrators access XRAS via https://xras-
admin.xsede.org/ . 
The supporting services are located at: Identity Service: https://xras-identity-service.xsede.org/v# 
Accounting Service: https://xras-accounting-service.xsede.org/v# Rules Engine: https://xras-rules-
service.xsede.org/api/v#/teragrid API: https://xras-submit-api.xsede.org/v# where v# indicates the current 
release version of the supporting service 
XRAS communicates with the XDCDB via AMIE, the accounting service and the identity service. 
A.35 User Portal, KnowledgeBase, Web Site, and Wiki 
HOSTNAME LOCATION ADMIN COMMENTS 
www.xsede.org TACC Maytal Dahan <maytal@tacc.utexas.edu>  
xdsecure.xsede.org TACC Maytal Dahan <maytal@tacc.utexas.edu>  
mobile.xsede.org TACC Maytal Dahan <maytal@tacc.utexas.edu>  
portal.xsede.org TACC Maytal Dahan <maytal@tacc.utexas.edu>  
xupdb.tacc.utexas.edu TACC Maytal Dahan <maytal@tacc.utexas.edu>  
xsede-httpd.tacc.utexas.edu TACC Maytal Dahan <maytal@tacc.utexas.edu>  
xuplogin.tacc.utexas.edu TACC Maytal Dahan <maytal@tacc.utexas.edu>  
api.xsede.org TACC Maytal Dahan <maytal@tacc.utexas.edu>  
 
The webpage, user portal and staff wiki are all presented as one unified environment to users, though the 
different pieces run on different software platforms with different access control lists. Furthermore, 
different functions such as login and the database are on different hosts. While not 100% critical to using 
XSEDE, the portal is the public face of the project and thus very important. 
Data 
Most of the private content is on the staff wiki, which is sensitive and password protected. XUP users will 
also need to login to manage their profile and certificate DNs. Certificates and other credentials are no 
longer stored on the server. 
Data Flow 
Some requests will push data to the XRAS system and from there to the XDCDB through AMIE. Data is 
also going more directly back and forth from the XDCDB through the AMIE server. 
There is also Kerberos communications with the XSEDE KDC and the xdsecure system. 
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Finally, the XUP communicates with the IIS and knowledgebase over web services (HTTP/REST). 
System Interfaces 
There is of course the traditional HTTP and HTTPS interface used by most users and between the 
different servers. Mysql over SSL is used to connect to the backend database. Also, on the backend there 






Appendix B. Risk Assessment Rankings 
Initial Risk Rankings Votes Matrix 
Basney Butler Hazlewood Rogers Schule Simmel Slagell Sparks Average Rounded STD
Vulnerability Index
1 1 1 0 1 2 0 0 0.71 1 0.69985421
2 1 1 1 2 0 1 0 0.86 1 0.63887656
3 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0.43 0 0.49487166
4 0 1 1 2 1 0 0 0.71 1 0.69985421
5 0 0 1 2 0 1 1 0.71 1 0.69985421
6 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 0.43 0 0.72843136
7 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0.57 1 0.49487166
8 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0.43 0 0.49487166
9 1 1 1 1 2 0 1 1.00 1 0.53452248
10 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 1.29 1 0.45175395
11 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0.43 0 0.49487166
12 0 1 1 2 1 0 0 0.71 1 0.69985421
13 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 1.29 1 0.45175395
14 0 1 0 1 0 1 2 0.71 1 0.69985421
15 1 0 0 2 2 0 2 1.00 1 0.9258201
16 1 1 2 2 2 0 2 1.43 1 0.72843136
17 0 0 0 2 1 0 2 0.71 1 0.88063057
18 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 1.29 1 0.45175395
19 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0.43 0 0.49487166
20 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0.57 1 0.49487166
21 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0.29 0 0.45175395
22 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 1.29 1 0.45175395
23 0 1 1 2 0 1 0 0.71 1 0.69985421
24 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0.43 0 0.72843136
25 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1.29 1 0.45175395
26 0 1 2 2 2 0 1 1.14 1 0.83299313
27 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 1.71 2 0.45175395
28 1 2 0 2 1 1 1 1.14 1 0.63887656
29 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 1.71 2 0.45175395
30 0 1 0 1 1 1 2 0.86 1 0.63887656
31 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 1.57 2 0.49487166
32 1 2 0 1 0 1 0 0.71 1 0.69985421
33 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 1.29 1 0.45175395
34 1 2 0 1 2 1 0 1.00 1 0.75592895
35 1 2 0 1 2 2 0 1.14 1 0.83299313
Enter 0 for low, 1 for medium and 2 for high.
Reference the table at https://www.xsede.org/web/staff/staff-wiki/-/wiki/Main/Vulnerability+Identification
If you are uncomfortable ranking an item, you may leave it blank.  
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Final Votes with Phone Meeting Notes 
Basney Butler Hazlewood Rogers Schule Simmel Slagell Sparks Average Rounded STD
Vulnerability Index
1 1 1 0 1 2 0 0 0.71 1 0.69985421
2 1 1 1 2 0 1 0 0.86 1 0.63887656
3 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0.43 0 0.49487166
4 0 1 1 2 1 0 0 0.71 1 0.69985421
5 0 0 1 2 0 1 1 0.71 1 0.69985421
6 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 0.43 0 0.72843136
7 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0.57 1 0.49487166
8 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0.43 0 0.49487166
9 1 1 1 1 2 0 1 1.00 1 0.53452248
10 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 1.29 1 0.45175395
11 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0.43 0 0.49487166
12 0 1 1 2 1 0 0 0.71 1 0.69985421
13 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 1.29 1 0.45175395
14 0 1 0 1 0 1 2 0.71 1 0.69985421
15 1 0 0 2 2 0 2 1.00 1 0.9258201
16 1 1 2 2 2 1 2 1.57 2 0.49487166
17 0 0 0 2 1 0 2 0.71 1 0.88063057
18 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 1.29 1 0.45175395
19 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0.43 0 0.49487166
20 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0.57 1 0.49487166
21 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0.29 0 0.45175395
22 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 1.29 1 0.45175395
23 0 1 1 2 0 1 0 0.71 1 0.69985421
24 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0.43 0 0.72843136
25 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1.29 1 0.45175395
26 0 1 2 2 2 0 1 1.14 1 0.83299313
27 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 1.71 2 0.45175395
28 1 2 0 2 1 1 1 1.14 1 0.63887656
29 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 1.71 2 0.45175395
30 0 1 0 1 1 1 2 0.86 1 0.63887656
31 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 1.57 2 0.49487166
32 1 2 0 1 0 1 0 0.71 1 0.69985421
33 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 1.29 1 0.45175395
34 1 2 0 1 2 1 0 1.00 1 0.75592895
35 1 2 0 1 2 2 0 1.14 1 0.83299313
Enter 0 for low, 1 for medium and 2 for high.
Reference the table at https://www.xsede.org/web/staff/staff-wiki/-/wiki/Main/Vulnerability+Identification
If you are uncomfortable ranking an item, you may leave it blank.
Changes after call:
Adam Changed his vote on #16 which removed the outlier.
Agreement on most items to go with the average. There was a question whether or not to generalize the GO item.




Final Risk Assessment Votes 
Basney Butler Hazlewood Rogers Schule Simmel Slagell Sparks Average Rounded STD
Vulnerability Index
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0.29 0 0.45175395
2 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0.43 0 0.49487166
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.14 0 0.34992711
4 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0.43 0 0.49487166
5 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0.43 0 0.49487166
6 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0.14 0 0.34992711
7 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0.29 0 0.45175395
8 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0.29 0 0.45175395
9 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0.71 1 0.45175395
10 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0.29 0 0.45175395
11 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0.29 0 0.45175395
12 0 2 1 0 1 0 1 0.71 1 0.69985421
13 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0.57 1 0.49487166
14 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0.57 1 0.49487166
15 0 2 0 1 1 1 0 0.71 1 0.69985421
16 0 2 0 0 1 2 2 1.00 1 0.9258201 No one objec            
17 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0.57 1 0.49487166
18 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0.71 1 0.45175395
19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00 0 0
20 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0.29 0 0.45175395
21 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0.43 0 0.49487166
22 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0.71 1 0.45175395
23 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0.71 1 0.45175395
24 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0.43 0 0.49487166
25 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0.57 1 0.49487166
26 Retired risk. Please Skip #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0!
27 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0.86 1 0.34992711
28 1 1 1 0 1 2 2 1.14 1 0.63887656
29 0 1 0 0 1 1 2 0.71 1 0.69985421
30 0 1 0 0 0 1 2 0.57 1 0.72843136 No one objec      
31 1 1 0 1 1 1 2 1.00 1 0.53452248
32 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0.57 1 0.49487166
33 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0.71 1 0.45175395
34 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0.57 1 0.49487166
35 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0.43 0 0.49487166
Enter 0 for low, 1 for medium and 2 for high.
Index maps to the table at https://www.xsede.org/web/staff/staff-wiki/-/wiki/Main/Vulnerability+Identification
If you are uncomfortable ranking an item, you may leave it blank.
Definitions of high, medium & low are at https://www.xsede.org/web/staff/staff-wiki/-/wiki/Main/XSEDE%20Federation%20Risk%20Assessment#section-XSEDE+Federation+Risk+Assess





Appendix C: XSEDE Relevant Threat Matrix 
 










Cracking Passwords on HPC 
Proxy to Hide Behind 
Dictionary Attack Services 
Establish Foothold / Monitor Trusted XDNet 









Proxy to Hide Behind 
Bot-herding 
Criminal Activities (spamming, host illegal 
content, etc) 
Dictionary Attack Services 









or configuration error) 
Bitcoin Mining 









Bold for common OR expected. 




Appendix D: Threat Profile Survey 
SCOPE: Keep in mind when answering each question that we are just interested in threats that can affect 
XSEDE as a whole by breaking the fundamental trust fabric, interrupting shared services, or bringing 
multiple SPs offline. We are not looking at the level of site-specific threats such as environmental or 
physical security problems. 
An example threat source would be a cyber criminal motivated by monetary gain. A corresponding threat 
action could be hijacking HPC(s) for bitcoin mining. 
#1 What kind of threat sources (e.g., criminals, crackers, hacktivists, insiders) have you seen in Teragrid 
incidents? What is most common? 
NCSA: Mostly hackers for fun. We likely have had criminals that want to use the resources for $$, but 
most of the incidents that we have caught have been within less than 24 hours, so there has been no time 
to monetize the hacks. 
NICS: It's difficult to determine identity behind an attack, especially if it is caught and thwarted quickly. 
Hackers that know what they are doing either proxy their connections through an intermediary to hide 
their identity or use some else's credentials to perpetrate the incident. By far, the most common threat 
has been account compromise and dealing with "unknown" users on the machines masquerading as 
legitimate users. Often times the attack sources tend to be from outside the United States. I doubt we 
have any/many "insider" threats (i.e., TG/XSEDE staff hacking our own systems). 
PSC: Generally, we don't know the motivations of attackers responsible for system or account 
compromises. Mostly we find their main interest is trying to expand the compromise by replacing SSHD, 
copying Keys and/or adding keys. To my knowledge there have been no known cases of insider hacking 
or actions by hackivists against TG/XSEDE resources. The most common security related activity is 
compromised user accounts. I would say about 85% of our effort is dealing with compromised accounts. 
The source of compromise is usually at the user's home institution, not on an XSEDE system. 
Purdue: I'd say criminals and crackers are the most common, with criminals the more common of the 
two. 
SDSC: Of the provided list, we've seen criminals, crackers, and insiders. Aside from a single incident 
(definitely a cracker), it's difficult to distinguish between criminals and crackers, since we don't know what 
their motives were. The insider incident(s) appear to be unintentional, rather than out of malice. By far, 
however, the most common threat has been automated attacks -- massive amounts of password 
guessing, port scanning, and the like. 
 
#2 Are there any new threat sources you would expect with XSEDE that you have not seen, and if so, 
why? 
NCSA: Not that I can think of. 
NICS: Any new threat sources would probably be due to globally changing threat profiles, not anything 
XSEDE specific. I predict that hactivism will increase, but this is not XSEDE specific. 
PSC: One of the goals of XSEDE is to reach more users. More users will likely lead to more compromised 
accounts. 
Purdue: I would expect hacktivism to become a threat due to the increased notoriety that groups like 
Anonymous and LulzSec and have gained in the past year and the increasing political unrest globally. 
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SDSC: With the recent media attention on groups like Anonymous and Lulzsec, I expect to see a rise in 
hacktivism. I don't see XSEDE resources being targeted by these specific groups, as the sort of work we 
do does not appear to be on their political agenda. However, this type of hacktivism may inspire other 
groups. I also expect to see a slightly different type of threat, created by outsiders, but launched by 
unwitting, non-specifically targeted insiders (e.g. trojaned or vulnerable software). The barriers to entry for 
programming are coming down and more junior and amateur programmers will be creating code that 
does something our users want to do. These types of programmers are likely to not have the discipline to 
write good code or protect their distribution chain against 3rd party modifications. 
 
#3 In instances in which you could infer, what has typically motivated (consider negligence a kind of 
motivation) attacks in Teragrid? 
NCSA: Most have been hacks of opportunity or convenience. Credentials were stolen that eventually led 
to our systems. I can't say that any of those attacks have been targeted specifically for NCSA or the 
Teragrid. 
NICS: The most common motivations are likely: Trophy/bragging; Ease of attack (due to unpatched 
systems, etc.). Although I can't point to any specific instances, I'm sure compromised TeraGrid systems 
have been used to send spam and attack other institutions. 
PSC: If you're meaning what was the situation that allowed an attack, poorly maintained systems (not 
properly patched against vulnerabilities), shared passwords that were compromised elsewhere, weak 
system passwords, improperly configured systems. Note that most of this applies to non-XSEDE systems 
though we have had some XSEDE compromises due to system vulnerabilities. 
Purdue: Based on recent events, financial motivation seems to be the most common. 
SDSC: As far as successful attacks on our resources go, they have been for ego and/or the result of 
unintentional error. 
 
#4 Are there any new attacker motivations you would expect with XSEDE that you have not seen, and if 
so, why? 
NCSA: Not that I can think of. Possibly bitcoin, which we have not seen specifically on a TG system yet 
but could happen. 
NICS: Any new attack motivations would probably be due to globally changing threat profiles, not 
anything XSEDE specific. 
PSC: A number of large-scale grids have recently experienced bitcoin mining. TG/XSEDE has not but I 
would expect we'll see such activity sometime in the future. 
Purdue: Based on #2, I'd expect political motivations to become an issue, either by active attack against 
targets or attempts at wikileaks-style disclosure. 
SDSC: None that I can think of at this time. The motivation list appears to cover the things I can think of. 
 
#5 What kind of incidents or threat actions (DoS launch, bitcoin mining, credential harvesting, password 
cracking, sabotage, interception, etc.) have you seen in TeraGrid? What are the most common? 
NCSA: Most common is compromised user account. Outside of that we have only seen a few others: 
terms of use violation, Web server vulnerability, internal incident (researcher copying data). 
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NICS: The most common is by far credential harvesting. We also have a fair amount of unauthorized 
account sharing, which makes security auditing more difficult. 
PSC: Known threats: Credential harvesting, system scanning, brute force attacks, spam on websites 
(very few). Not seen: Bitcoin mining, password cracking (maybe many, many, years ago), sabotage. 
Purdue: I'm aware of DoS and bitcoin mining on resources and password cracking or social engineering 
attacks against user credentials (sometimes at other resources). 
SDSC: On our TG systems, we've seen credential harvesting and stone-stepping or using the 
compromised account and machine to attack other resources. On our non-TG systems, we've also seen 
unauthorized use of the host to launch DOS attacks, run bots, run irc proxies, run reverse web proxies, 
host illegal content, and perform network sniffing. 
 
#6 Are there any new threat actions you would expect with XSEDE that you have not seen, and if so, 
why? 
NCSA: Not that I can think of offhand. 
NICS: XSEDE plans to interoperate more with campuses, which will lead to more exposure. Our user 
base may be wider, and their identity may be less known. Additionally, the grid architecture is changing to 
include more software and technologies that may have inherent vulnerabilities not yet discovered. Most 
new threat actions would probably be due to globally changing threat profiles, not anything XSEDE 
specific. 
PSC: I think that we'll see threats from the more open nature of the XSEDE program vs Teragrid. An 
example of this is the short lived, ad-hoc, network connections that are expected (PSU & UMN). 
Supporting federated authentication will likely increase the number of XSEDE users which may lead to 
more compromised accounts, so we'll need to develop a response plan with federation partners. 
Purdue: I don't foresee any new threat actions, but I would expect a general increase in existing actions. 
SDSC: Along with the rise of hacktivism, I would not be surprised to see attacks on our users' research -- 
impeding research by destroying data, or invalidating (discrediting) research by tampering with it. Identity 
(and data in general) theft may be a new threat action if our users deliberately or inadvertently use 
XSEDE resources to process PII, PHI, or politically sensitive data. As a final comment, I think it's only a 
matter of time before the criminals and crackers who get on to an HPC machine realize what they have 
access to and start using the system as a legitimate user would, blending into the noise. 




Appendix E: Vulnerability Identification Survey 
#1 How does XSEDE monitor for new security patches for software in the baseline software and services 
document? 
Baer: Most of that software comes from xsede partners in the xsede services document. Troy relies on a 
push from growls like globus, 
McNally: Maybe better to ask Troy for stuff in baseline. Stephen's group is more focused on shared 
systems and services services in the XSEDE Services Master Spreadsheet. For those, they mostly rely 
on security ops to tell them if there is a new vulnerability.  
 
#2 How do we ensure each SP is up-to-date? Do we help to roll out updates to the SPs? 
Baer: We notify SPs, but don't push them. Unless there is a serious security vulnerability and security ops 
is pushing for it to rollout, SPa update when and if they feel like it. Also, ctss registration is maintained by 
hand. It is easy to update software and not update your registration. globus will monitors in an automated 
way and tells Troy about Sps running old versions. CTSS is not terrible convenient, and the information is 
stale. It would be nice if INCA or something else could go out and grab this info from SPs. 
McNally: Ask Troy for more user facing services and deployments at the SPs. 
 
#3 What software in the baseline services document no longer has support or active development? 
Baer: There is no clear list of which pieces are not supported anyone. 
McNally: This is a better question for Troy. 
 
#4 Are you aware of any security inconsistencies in deployments that could allow an attacker to more 
easily gain access at one site and use the trust fabric of XSEDE (e.g., GSI certificates) to spread their 
attack? 
Baer: Some sites accept passphraseless ssh keys, some will but don't let users manage them. 
Marsteller: More than even inconsistencies in password and authentication policies, the SPs differ 
greatly in how they protect their borders and harden their systems. Some even allow telnet to through 
their border, and some don't do any network monitoring. This all ties back to the need for a baseline 
services document that is agreed upon and followed. 
McNally: There is no detailed security baseline. A lot of this is ad hoc. SDSC has quarterly updates of 
AMIE and XDCDB. More often than not Stephen's group follows the leads of SPs like SDSC. 
 
#5 Would you add any items or classes of items to the exiting vulnerability table? 
Baer: Genesis II containers are like their own CAs. Maybe we need to sign genesis root certs. Hopefully 
new services like this won't require rolling out and maintaining a separate PKI from what we already have. 
Marsteller: It is pretty complete without any major categories or areas uncovered. 
McNally: POPS has no offsite redundancy, ticket system. Critical pieces seem to all be replicated off site. 
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Quinn: POPs is not replicated offsite currently. POPS is like Fastlane for XSEDE. It is a separate Sybase 
database and connects via AMIE to the XDCDB. It is the starting point for all new accounts and 
allocations. 
Wefel: Maybe DoS attacks using XD resources. That is more of a threat than a vulnerability though. 
Adam can go through the table and see if there is a vulnerability to match that threat against. 
 
#6 Would you modify the vulnerabilities of corresponding threats already listed? 
Baer: Need to take a closer look. 
Marsteller: Nothing major, but Marsteller will make some minor edits to the wiki page directly. 
McNally: None of them are supercritical. Look at the tiers in the master spreadsheet. 
Wefel: DNSSEC is used, but not exclusively. We delegate subdomains to other SPs, and for some of 
those we sync with DNSSEC. The xsede.org root DNS at NCSA and SDSC sync over regular tcp 
connection to a hidden master server unreachable from other IPs. 
 
#7 Are you aware of security policies or procedures that are not effectively being realized? 
Marsteller: Most policies are not being effectively communicated and none audited for compliance. This 
is especially true for sites new to XSEDE. 
 
#8 What policies are we missing or most critically need to update? 
Marsteller: Most policies are out-of-date as they are from TG. The most important to update in the short 
term is the security baseline document and incident response playbook. We should also create a 
document explaining the security responsibilities of SPs (at least for level 1 & 2). Another thing to 
consider is putting in place processes for revoking credentials for key XSEDE staff. 
 
#9 Are you aware of any XSEDE resources or services that have experienced downtime as a result of a 
security incident? 
Marsteller: Not in XSEDE yet, but in TG it was not uncommon for a site's compute resources to go offline 
because of a compromise. Some other shared services have gone down due to compromise, like INCA, 
but at least no critical shared services like the portal, CA or central database. 
 
#10 What is the most sensitive kind of data held in the XCDB? 
Quinn: There is contact info on people and allocations info for PIs. However, all accepted proposals are 




#11 Who can see each type of data? 
Quinn: Each SP has an account management person with read-only access. TAS XDmod group (at 
Buffalo) has read-only access and a synchronized copy of the database. The half dozen DBAs at NCSA 
& SDSC have both read and write access. 
 
#12 How is the XCDB backed up and how often? 
Quinn: It is synchronized between PSC and SDSC every 10 minutes. SDSC backs it up every night. 
 
#13 How do we know a that an XSEDE user in the database maps to a real person and that the contact 
info is correct? 
Quinn: Vetting of PIs is done through the award process by committees, such as, XRAC. Users are 
vetted when by PIs when they are added to an allocation. Out of band the user gives the PI the account 
name to add. Users fill out their own contact info and could falsify that, though the PI should at some point 
know the mapping of person to account name from when they added someone to an allocation. Prior to 
adding someone to an allocation, there is no record in the XDCDB or DN. 
 
#14 How do we know credentials get to the right person? Can you walk me through the process? 
Quinn: Credentials are created with the account creation process. Anyone can create an account, which 
is nothing more than a Kerberos principal and login to the XUP. They set the password when they create 
the account. 
 
#15 What is the process for resetting XSEDE passwords? 
Quinn: It is self-service on the portal. 
 
#16 What is the process for correcting mistaken information in the XCDB? 
Quinn: It is self-service on the portal for user information; manual for things like mistakes in the 
allocation. 
 
#17 Do accounts become deactivated after a certain amount of time without use? 
Quinn: Maytal may have that setup now, but Steve is unsure. 
 
#18 What are the critical services for data services in XSEDE, including supporting services such as 
CAs? 
Simmel: These are mostly the AuthN/Z infrastructure (PKI, Kerberos, local SP accounts) and gridftp 
services for now. We'll see when GFFS is rolled out. There are local archives like MSS and Golem as well 
as a wide area Lustre filesystem called Albito. But these are not XSEDE-wide resources, and it's hard to 




#19 Does XSEDE data services need to be very concerned about PII or proprietary data services? 
Simmel: No real PII, in fact you aren't supposed to put it on our resources as an XSEDE user per the 
AUP. If SPs allow non-XSEDE users special privilege, like private sector partners, that's their own 
business. 
 
#20 What sort of service guarantees are we giving to users? For example, in terms of data isolation, 
privacy and backups? 
Simmel: We give few if any guarantees on privacy. The default POSIX permissions are sufficient to meet 
those minimal guarantees. Some sites may promise to backup home directories, but it is not an XSEDE 
policy 
 
#21 Is the security model consistent regardless of how data sets are moved (e.g., GO vs. XUP files 
system services)? 
Simmel: It depends on what consistent means. But depending on how data is transferred, it may or may 
not be encrypted. Authentication mechanisms may differ. We are consistent in that all mechanisms meet 
the minimal guarantees promised users. None of this considers campus bridging. 
 
#22 Does the unavailability of and XSEDENet link fall over to other routes? In other words, would 
services lose connection if XSEDENet went offline, or just have reduced service? 
Wefel: Service would be reduced possibly, but nothing would be unreachable. 
 
#23 Are there privacy concerns if a perfsonar node is compromised? 
Wefel: While root on that node can get full packet captures, this is just performance traffic directed to the 
perfsonar nodes. So one cannot sniff user data or xfers. 
 
#24 Is there any private data in the XSEDE DNS? 
Wefel: No, it is just public cnames, A records and SRV records. 
 
#25 Would compromise of the DNS servers allow anything other than DoS attacks, or are there services 
trusting the DNS responses without other authentication mechanisms? 
Wefel: Unsure. Slagell can only think of SSH that is not gsi-based and hence doesn't use certificates. 
Basney notes "The other DNS insecurity that comes to mind is that Globus software by default relies on 
DNS for hostname canonicalization. 
See:http://dev.globus.org/wiki/C_Security:_Server_Identity_Processing_In_GSI_C. Setting 
GLOBUS_GSSAPI_NAME_COMPATIBILITY=STRICT_RFC2818 in your environment disables the 
insecure hostname canonicalization in Globus code." 
